

The Twofold Nature of Knowledge

Josiah Royce

The World's Columbian Exposition

Chicago, Illinois - 1893

While doing some research on Charles Peirce and the Open Court, André De Tienne came across the published version of a lecture that Royce gave at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago, Illinois, in 1893. This published lecture reference does not appear in bibliographies of Royce's writings.

André presents the following information on the lecture:

"It is connected to the MSS in the two folders labeled "Box 62 #3," in Frank Oppenheim's Index. I have the impression, perhaps mistaken, that the existence of that publication was not known. It was known that Royce had presented a paper in Chicago, which he subsequently recycled two or three times in subsequent papers on "The External World and Social Consciousness," later expanded in his 1895 article on "Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness, and Nature," a paper read before the Philosophical Club of Brown University on 23 May 1895, later enlarged again and published in *Studies of Good and Evil* (Appleton, 1898), pp. 198–248. But that the 1893 Chicago presentation had been published in 1898 in the Columbian Exposition volume may not have been known."

A HISTORY ^{OF} THE WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION



HELD IN CHICAGO IN 1893


BY AUTHORITY OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS

EDITED BY
ROSSITER JOHNSON

FULLY ILLUSTRATED

IN FOUR VOLUMES
Vol. IV. CONGRESSES

NEW YORK
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
1898



R. Spofford, James Schouler, James Phinney Baxter, Cora Start, and others-Congress of Philologists
-Papers read by eminent scholars-Folklore Congress-Congress of Librarians.

CHAPTER VII.

THE EDUCATIONAL CONGRESSES 179

Organization of the work-President Bonney's opening address-Dr. Harris's report-The Congress on Kindergarten Education-Fraulein Schepel's address-Other speakers and their themes-The Congress of Representative Youth-The Congress on Psychology-Congresses on General and Higher Education-President Gilman's address-President Kellogg's address-Discussion of uniformity in universities-The question of studying Greek-Arguments by Prof. Hale and President Jordan-The Congress on Manual Education-Prof. Woodward's address-The Congress on University Extension -Prof. Stuart's history of the movement-The Congress of College Students-The Congress of College Fraternities.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE WORLD'S PARLIAMENT OF RELIGIONS 221

Character of the conference-The committee-The preliminary address and the responses to it -Opening ceremonies-Extracts from many of the papers that were read-Confucianism-The Brahmo-Somaj-Shintoism-Christianity and Mohammedanism compared-Buddhism-The world's debt to Buddha-The Parsees-The Armenian Church-Hinduism-Evolution and Christianity-Congress of Missions-Sunday rest-Denominational Congresses-Inquiry rooms-Spirit of the work-Reasons for success.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ART CONGRESSES 338

Architecture-Painting-Sculpture-Decoration-Ceramics-Candace Wheeler on Decorative and Applied Art-T. E. Cope on English Household Porcelain-Timothy Cole on Wood Engraving in America.

CHAPTER X.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS 357

Kant's Fallacy, the Immortality of the Soul, Form of Hand and Character, Synthetic Philosophy, the Twofold Nature of Knowledge, Realism in Art and Literature, and many other topics discussed-Papers by William T. Harris, W. Lutoslawski, Francis Galton, Brother Azarias, Josiah Royce, Louis J. Block, and others.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CONGRESS ON EVOLUTION 411

President Bonney's opening address-A letter from Prof. Huxley-A letter from Herbert Spencer-Addresses by Sara A. Underwood, Rev. William J. Potter, Florence G. Buckstaff, James A. Skilton, Prof. Haeckel, Dr. R. G. Eccles, Rev. Minot J. Savage, Rev. H. M. Simmons, Rev. James T. Bixby, and others.

CHAPTER XII.

PRESIDENT BONNEY'S CLOSING ADDRESS 481

CHAPTER XIII.

THE EDUCATIONAL AND MORAL VALUE OF THE EXPOSITION (written expressly for this work by Selim Hobart Peabody) 488

What individuals learned from it, and what nations learned-How it may affect home life, educational methods, public morals, and universal brotherhood.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 497

INDEX TO THE FOUR VOLUMES 509




Plan of the Horticultural Garden on the Wooded Island,

CHAPTER X.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS.

Kant's Fallacy, the Immortality of the Soul, Form of Hand and Character, Synthetic Philosophy, the Twofold Nature of Knowledge, Realism in Art and Literature, and many other topics discussed-Papers by William T. Harris, W. Lutoslawski, Francis Galton, Brother Azarias, Josiah Royce, Louis J. Block, and others.



SIR FRANCIS GALTON,
a contributor to the Congress,

THE Congresses of the Department of Science and Philosophy were opened in the Hall of Columbus, on the morning of August 21, with an address of welcome by President Bonney. After responses in behalf of the various congresses and countries, the general divisions assembled in the halls assigned to them.

The Congresses of this department were highly successful. The Philosophical Congress under the chairmanship of Dr. R. N. Foster, the Geological Congress under the chairmanship of Prof. T. C. Chamberlin, the Chemical Congress under the chairmanship of Prof. J. H. Long, the Meteorological Congress under the chairmanship of Chief M. W. Harrington, the Electrical Congress under the chairmanship of Prof. Elisha Gray, the Astronomical Congress under the chairmanship of Prof. George W. Hough, the Psychological Congress under the chairmanship of Dr. Elliott Coues, and the Congress on Evolution under the direction of Secretary James A. Skilton-all attracted marked attention by the variety, comprehensiveness, and importance of their work. From Dr. Foster's introductory address the following extracts are made:

'For,' says St. Paul, 'the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made ; his eternal power also and divinity.'

" He drew all things from nothingness by means of his divine Word, for he spoke and they were made, he commanded and they were created. This word is his $\rho\omega\sigma$ nature, the second person of his triune divinity, and the medium of his creative act.

"It has been seen that as an infinitely intelligent being God creates for a purpose. That purpose must necessarily be himself. No other is worthy of him. Therefore, to have a finite effort worthy of an infinite first and final cause-to have cosmos worthy of its creator-God raised it above the limited plane on which it stood, and gave it a significance that rendered it adequate to its infinitude. As the first act was by the Word, it was proper that the same Word should bring that act to its completion, which was done by the union of the Word with cosmos through man-'and the Word was made flesh.' Thus in this principle we have a formula into which God and his creation-its origin and destiny, its alpha and omega-are all condensed. It is the sum of all philosophy.

"In the term 'God' we have the subject of theodicy and natural theology. In the term cosmos we have the idea that gives us the ideas of space and time, with all their concomitant ideas of number, extension, mathematics, natural history, and physics.

" In the term 'the Word' is contained the title of creation, the basis of history, the ideal of literature and art. 'There is but one Word, and that Word all things speak.' In the term 'completes its destiny in the Word,' we have the whole supernatural order-a Church, its means of sanctification.

"In the term 'actualizes,' we have the idea of pure and supreme Cause expressed, and the real relations of the Creator to his creature.

"When John the Evangelist, after gazing with love and reverence upon the infinity of God's being, burst forth into the sublime words that are the opening of his gospel, he not only gave us the relations of the Son to his eternal Father, but in words of divine inspiration he summed up the whole of philosophy. We have only sought to embody his idea in a philosophic terminology. Traces of it are found everywhere. They exist in the marred beauties of literature and in the broken harmonies of the universe. The philosophy that would preserve Christianity must cling to the Word, and it will find itself more enlightened than the atheistic speculations that would reject the one or the other. All science begins and ends in mystery. The atheist shuts out from the horizon of his knowledge the mysteries both of Christianity and the Word, while the Christian philosopher takes them into account and endeavors to explain them. In doing so he is more consistent. That would be an inadequate theory of light that would refuse to explain the phenomena of darkness."

Following Brother Azarias, Prof. Josiah Royce, of Harvard University,

presented a paper on The Twofold Nature of Knowledge, which we give herewith:

"If you wish *to* understand your relation to the world, first understand the nature of your own thinking process; such is the principle of all critical philosophy, as it has existed in the world ever since the time of Socrates. The present paper is an effort to contribute toward this general end of our self-comprehension of the business and the processes of thinking. I shall discuss certain aspects of the nature of knowledge, because of the light that such a discussion may throw upon the discoverable constitution of the world of truth.

"Human thinking is in every individual case an effort, made by an intelligent being, to imitate in his own way the form and structure of the truth that exists beyond this particular thinking. Consequently the business of knowing is essentially an imitative business. But human thinking is also an effort, made by this same being, to give his own ideas a certain inner clearness, self-consistency, assurance, self-possession—in a word, to give himself a genuine self-consciousness. Hence the business of knowing is also essentially a reflective undertaking. But I imitate when I give myself over to a relatively foreign authority, whose constitution or activity I submissively try to reproduce in myself. On the other hand, so it would very obviously seem, I reflect when I retire into my own inner world, and there, with a certain relative independence, endeavor not merely to re-embodify what an external authority suggests, but to construct for myself what shall, in the outcome, seem good in my own eyes. But now all our rational thinking is somehow an effort to accomplish both these ends at once. The question arises, How are the two ends related? How are these two equally necessary undertakings of our thought to be harmonized? On the answer to this question as to the relation of the imitative and the reflective aspects of thought a great deal depends as regards our philosophical definition of the world of truth. I therefore need make no apology for asking the attention of this Congress to a topic so ancient and yet so perennially fresh.

"The life of our consciousness, the mental life that you and I experience from moment to moment, and so the whole world of the knowledge that you and I possess of anything in heaven or earth, may be regarded, with respect to the various individual moments of our inner lives, from three points of view—namely, as the object of an immediate knowledge, as the object of a reflective knowledge, and as the embodiment of what I shall call an imitative knowledge.

"In the first place, your whole inner life, and mine too, is a mass of present experience, which is whatever it happens to be, and so has what may be called its immediate character. In this immediate character our mental life consists of present sensations, memories, feelings—in a word, of content, of *Bewusstseinsinhalt*, as several German writers have recently called it, or, again, of what Hume defined as impressions and ideas. Our knowledge,

then, in so far as it is merely a knowledge of the content of this moment, may be called immediate knowledge. Your present pain or pleasure, the peculiar and indescribable quality of any sensation-of the odor of a rose, or of the tones of a violin, or of a private grief, or of a personal love of your own-such experience, I say, is of this immediate character. And such immediate knowledge enters, as we know, into all our most elaborate and scientific knowledge. Without feeling, no insight; without direct experience, no reflection or other thought; without immediacy, no mediation. There is something peculiar and individual, meanwhile, about this immediate content of each moment, something unique, which can never be repeated. The moment dies and its flavor is gone. This feeling you shall never feel again, this immediate knowledge you shall never repeat. In the phrase of Heraclitus: Into the same stream no one twice descends. And consciousness, in so far as it is immediate, is this sort of Heraclitean flux. Each of its moments must be appreciated alone by itself, and, so to speak, is not public property. Nor can this feeling, as *this* feeling, ever be exhaustively described. Our moments are isolated like our hearts. The heart knoweth its own heaviness, and each moment its own incommunicable inner content of sensations, emotions, interests. How does the shock of a Leyden jar feel? What is the taste of olives? The moment of experience knows, and in certain respects it can never articulately tell this which it knows to any other moment. Memory we say preserves the flavor of a moment for the future. But each moment of memory is once more an individual moment-here and not there in time-present as a memory of the past, but still a memory not in so far as its content is past, but in so far as its own peculiar experience once more is here in time, and, as it were, simply undertakes or pretends to be a representation of the past. Representations of past events are themselves present events; they are therefore not the past events represented. And the past events themselves are dead when they are represented. And so in its immediate character each moment of life, whether it is called a representation or not, stands alone, and is, strictly speaking, never repeated. Such is the world of immediate knowledge in so far as it is immediate. I say now that all your mental life and mine, no matter what we do or think-high or low, wise or foolish-has always, in one aspect, this immediate character.

"On the other hand, however, all immediate knowledge is essentially incomplete knowledge, and it is so just because it is, as immediate, inexpressible. Real and complete knowledge is never merely immediate, but is also what may be called, technically, derived or mediated knowledge-knowledge, namely, that can, so to speak, record itself, and can say for all time: This or this truth is true, this or this insight from this point of view is always to be stated thus and thus. Therefore, just in so far as each moment has a unique and incommunicable character, this character in being the object of an immediate knowledge is no object of a complete knowledge. Complete knowledge,

such as one aims to get in the scientifically or philosophically interpreted experience, involves indeed immediate knowledge as an organic part of itself and depends upon actual experience obtained in moments, but is itself more than such knowledge. There is nothing in heaven or earth, as Hegel pointed out, whose complete knowledge does not involve a union of mediacy and of immediateness.

"Such complete knowledge is itself of two kinds, to be expressed in our second and third points of view. We obtain our articulate, our expressible insight, only by living through the immediate experiences of our various moments; but the articulate insights themselves take two shapes. They are, namely, either reflective insights or imitative insights. To be sure, as we shall see, the two sorts of knowledge are never sundered; but they are distinguishable, and are often opposed to each other, and it is well for the first to keep them asunder.

"In the next place, my knowledge is reflective in so far as at any moment or in successive moments I say: This experience or this expression of my experience means to me this or this. At one moment I feel a vague longing, and at the next I happen to think of some object, and thereupon I say to myself: 'Ah, that object was what my longing unconsciously aimed at, that was what I wanted, only I did not know it.' At one moment I am struggling to remember a certain musical theme, say the melody of the finale of the Heroic Symphony. At the next I recall a theme and then say: 'Yes, that was what I all the time aimed at and meant, only I could not remember it until now.' Or, once more, I have just had a thought, no matter whether true or false, and have stated it in a proposition. I have, for example, uttered the words 'All men are mortal.' Now, as I did this, my immediate experience was of the sounds of the words, and of various fleeting images and feelings as I uttered these words. But meanwhile for my reflection all this mass of feelings has meant something to me. And that it has meant something appears if I restate this meaning by immediate inference in another shape and say: 'Ah, that means the same as saying that no immortals are men.' If I clearly see the identity of meaning in the midst of the fleeting content of these two moments, I have a reflective knowledge—a knowledge which transcends the immediate, and which is such that its object is not a mere incommunicable mass of momentary experience, but a meaning that can remain identical in the midst of widely changing expressions.

"When I reflect thus on my meaning, what I hold before me, then, is the identity of this meaning through a series of actual or possible changes of immediate experience. When we wonder whether a man knows what he means, we ask him to restate his meaning in other language. If he can do this with a clear insight into the unity of the meaning in the midst of the changing and shifting of the immediate contents of his consciousness, then and then only can even he himself be sure that he grasps his own meaning.

"Observe, the object of reflective knowledge has always also its immediate aspect. No such thing exists as a wholly disembodied or unexpressed meaning. And the embodiment of a meaning is, as such, the object of an immediate experience. Observe, further, that, in so far as one reflects, the important thing is not that two successive moments of his life have a more or less similar content. The important thing is that he reflectively observes them to have, not similar, but actually identical meanings. One who hears the same melody many times repeated, and whose immediate experience therefore consists of a series of repeatedly similar, but numerically wholly different, contents, and who merely listens, or who even observes the mere similarity of his experiences—such a hearer is not, in so far, reflecting on his own meaning at all. But one who in mind tries to think of the forgotten melody, and who, after vain struggles, at last finds it, says to himself, not: 'This melody now found is as an experience similar to the one which I sought'; he says: 'This is the identical melody that I meant, or that I was looking for.' Just so that the repeatedly similar experiences of melody should themselves all be experiences of the same melody, is again something which we know only by reflection upon what we mean by *the same*. In successive moments of immediate experience there can only be similarity, not sameness, for the moments are actually diverse.



JOSIAH ROYCE,
a speaker at the Congress.

Ten thousand shocks of a Leyden jar will not give you any notion of what you will call the same shock. But for one who reflects on his meaning, the word same, as applied to the jar as a permanent object, will have significance; for a permanent object, for me, is one that, at many moments, is meant by me as a permanent object.

" If by reflection we thus know the identity of our meaning at various moments of our experience, the question, of course, arises, How can we know this identity when the contents of immediate experience are themselves always changing? And it is an old idea in philosophy that this identity of meaning is to be somehow explained by saying, as Kant said in the Deduction of the Categories, something of the following sort: I, the Self, know myself as one, in the Unity of Apperception, through all my changing experiences. My immediate knowledge flits in moments. My meaning remains identical, because I, the thinking Subject, remain one, and because now, thus remaining one, I am able to recognize the identity of my own conscious acts in many successive moments. To reflect on the identity of my meaning

in various thoughts is to observe myself as one in act in the midst of the shifting floods of immediacy. This I do whenever I reflect. In reflecting on my meaning, I therefore presuppose and assume, as it were, the discovery of myself. It is then the Self, the Ego, the identical knower of meanings, that forms the true object of reflective knowledge.

"But by this assertion the problem of reflective knowledge is only introduced, not solved. No word has more manifold meanings than the word Self. This ambiguity is familiar and necessary, and, for my part, I can not regret what to my mind is simply a result of the nature of things. But this ambiguity of the word Self, and of the deliverances of Self-Consciousness, is, at all events, problematic. If in reflective knowledge I know myself, who then am I?

"As is well known, I am, at all events, not merely an object of reflective consciousness for myself. Not alone as the knower of meanings, the Self as Subject, do I exist in my own consciousness. I am also an object to myself in numerous far less exalted ways. As so-called Empirical Ego, I exist in all kinds of immediate and derived forms as an object. As an object of merely immediate knowledge, a mere mass of organic sensations, I exist for myself whenever I think of my own general state of personal well-being and of ill being. As Empirical Ego I include also, very often, this body as a part of me. My life, my calling, my fortunes, my powers, yes, my children, or even my country, I can regard as part of my Empirical Ego. And in such senses I am for myself a vast mass of empirical objects and conditions which form in a greater or less degree one whole. But the Self as thus determined, the Self as object in the strict sense, or the Empirical Ego, is not the Self whose exalted identity, as the knower of the identity of meanings amidst the flux of experiences, reflective knowledge is to recognize. The question is, Who is this true, this identical and knowing Self, and in what form is he known to exist?

"In answer it may be said, we know the true Self, this Subject-Object of reflective consciousness, this Kantian Unity of Apperception, merely through a direct observation of the actual connection which exists between the various contents of our consciousness, when once these contents have been presented in experiences. This connection, this unity of consciousness, it will next be said is notoriously something quite indescribable, and in itself it constitutes the most ultimate and obvious of facts to every being that, once possessing it, has somehow been led to notice it. At any moment the contents of my consciousness, whether they be a mere mass of sensations or a chance collection of perceptions, or again a collection of intelligent ideas derived from social intercourse, are shifting and fleeting. But nevertheless this shifting and fleeting mass of facts is observed by an observer who is more than the mere series itself, for he knows the series, or at least, at any instant, knows some portion of it.

"But here the problem of the nature of this knower of the unity of con-

sciousness returns upon us in a new shape. The essential character of this observer, this knowing subject, is expressed by a familiar passage in Hume -viz., the very passage where Hume was most endeavoring to rid himself of the idea of the unity of consciousness itself: 'For my part,' run the well-known words of Hume, 'when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other - of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.... The mind is a kind of theater, where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity' in it at one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propensity we have to imagine that simplicity and identity.'

"These words of Hume are meant to be a reduction of the Self to the mere series of states that it knows, but it is indeed true that they are explicitly opposed in the very form of their statement to the assertion that Hume supposed them to embody. 'When I enter most intimately into what I call myself,' says Hume. 'I enter,' then - that is, I observe, I watch, I find, I know. But, adds Hume, *what* I know is always some content of consciousness, some impression or idea. Yes, indeed; but to say this is explicitly to say that, when I know this content as immediate, my knowing itself is not the content known, but is just precisely the knowing thereof. *That* I know, this truth is itself more than the content known. And so Hume, in the very act of asserting that the known is, as such, merely content, and never other than content, mere ideas, and never a peculiar thing, called a Self, and yet different from all other content even while it remains a content - Hume, I say, in asserting this about the known, implies, yes, in the words: 'When I enter ... I stumble on, I catch,' he explicitly asserts that the knower is, and is more than the content known. I, as Subject of knowledge, am indeed never the known content; but that is the very proof that the Self is not, and can not be reduced to, the series of states that it knows. I am thus far indeed known only as knower, but that is precisely what, by definition, I ought to be.

"I may observe here that Hume's phrases in this classical passage, in their very denial of the finding of a thing called an identical Self as a part or fact in the stream of immediate conscious states, are curiously near to those other and equally classic phrases whereby the early Hindu thinkers of the Upanishads loved to express their magnificent struggle to grasp the conception of the true Self and of its unique and transcendent existence. 'The Seer,' says Yajnavalkya, in the Brhadaranjakopanishad, 'the Seer no one has seen, the Hearer no one has heard, the Thinker no one has thought, the Knower no one has known.' So far we have, as you see, Hume, null mit ein Bi'schen anderer Worten. Hume consequently declares, however, what in his own words, in the very act of declaring it, have of necessity to contradict

-viz., that there therefore is no Self different from the series of the seen, heard, and felt states, the impressions and ideas. But Yajnavalkya goes on, upon the basis of the very same observations, to say : 'The one who, dwelling in the Self, is different from the Self, whom the Self knows not, who, dwelling within, guides the Self, he is, as thy [true] Self, the immortal inner guide.... There is no other Seer, no other Hearer, no other Thinker, no other Knower. That is, as thy [true] Self, the immortal inner guide ; whatever is other than this must suffer.' Upon the basis, however, of a similar argument, the same Yajnavalkya, in another section of the same Upanishad, argues to his wife Maitreyi as to the transcendent unity of the Self. Maitreyi has asked her husband to explain immortality to her. He first replies that the true Self is immortal, but that after death-that is, apart from the merely empirical series of conscious states, of impressions and ideas-after death, when the highest Self, for whose sake alone all is good that is good, has returned to itself, and dwells apart in its absolute perfection, then there can indeed be no consciousness whatever. The true Self is thus absolute and deathless, but unconscious. Maitreyi expresses doubts as to this result. It confuses her, she says. Yajnavalkya replies : 'This suffices, oh, dear one, to make the thing clear. For if there be in existence a second [that is, an object other than the subject], then one sees another, then one tastes another, then one greets another, then one hears another, then one thinks another, then one knows another. But when all has become to any one the Self, wherewith and whom should he then see ? vWherewith and whom should he then taste ? vWherewith and whom should he then greet ? Wherewith and whom should he then hear ? Wherewith and whom should he then think ? \Therewith and whom should he then know ? Wherewith should he know Him, through whom he knows all this ? Wherewith should he, oh, dear one, know the Knower ?'

"The antinomy is here, in its way, perfect. Hume and Yajnavalkya agree as to the fundamental facts of the situation. No one has seen the Seer or known the Knower as part of the series of states of consciousness. Hume enters into himself only to observe that he, Hume, precisely in so far as he is the Subject, is not discoverable there in himself, as one of his own inner states, at all. Yajnavalkya points out to Maitreyi and to his other interlocutors, that in a similar fashion, since one necessarily sees or hears another (i. e., an object) and not the Seer or Hearer, therefore one who is conscious must be conscious only of empirical stuff, must suffer in this bondage, as the Hindu likes to phrase it ; must have impressions, as Hume would say. The independent and self-possessed Self can not thus suffer. The form of the argument is in the two cases different ; the outcome is so far the same. I as I, or, as the metaphysicians like to define me, I the pure Subject, am thus never one of my own contents of consciousness. I have no immediate knowledge or inner experience of myself as Subject, for the Self of immediate knowledge or experience is nothing but a mass of organic sensa-

tions. Nor have I such mediate or derived knowledge of myself as pure Subject as I have of the objects of the physical world. The Self as physical object is, on the contrary, merely the body, and the sum total of its deeds and works, but never the true Self as Knower. Thus neither in the inner nor in the outer world do I ever find an object that can properly be called the identical Subject, the knower, the thinker, the seer, the hearer. So far, as you see, Hume and Yajñavalkya, the shrewdly merciless modern skeptic and the dim and legendary mystic of the homilies of this Upanishad, are actually at one. They both alike say, When I appeal *to* experience, when with Hume I look for the 'original' of the idea myself, or when, in the mystical speech, I merely suffer from the facts of fleeting experience, I never find the so-called identical Self at all. When in an empirical search for my true Self I enter into myself, I discover, so to speak, that I am not at home, not to be found there, as identical Subject, in the world of experience. I have, so I find, simply gone *out* of that world of experience altogether before one can look for me there. Where, then, am I--the identical Subject, the unity of apperception, the true Self, the one Knower of the many fleeting facts? I am not here in this tomb of experience where I look for my true Self. They have taken my Lord away, and I know not where they have laid him. This, for both Hume and Yajñavalkya, is the essence of this situation. But here indeed the two part company. Henceforward the two doctrines stand to each other as Thesis and Antithesis of a great antinomy.

"Such is the situation of reflective knowledge thus far. It must presuppose, yet can not find, the true Self, the identical subject for whom meanings are one in the world of fleeting immediate facts. How shall we deal with this antinomy ?

"It is the rule that one tends to clarify situations of this sort if one first, for a while, turns one's attention away from a direct examination of the conflict, and considers; perhaps in a highly empirical and tentative way, the mental processes whereby the conflict has arisen. One solves, to be sure, no ultimate philosophical problems by a direct application of the methods of empirical psychology. But one often, by means of such methods, clarifies to one's own mind the situation, until it is ready for a philosophical solution.

"Let us, then, turn our attention for a little from the reflective problem of how we are able, through the unity of self-consciousness, to recognize the identity of our own meaning in the midst of the flood of fleeting immediate experience. Let us consider the other aspect of our knowledge. Let us examine the general relation between our thinking and the external objects that it thinks about.

"As a fact, my thought never has a meaning merely for the sake of having one. What I mean when I think has always to do with my relations to objects that exist outside of my thought. My thought is not only an object of my own reflective insight ; it is also an effort to imitate the truth

of things. \When I say that *all men are mortal*, I not only have a meaning which can be reflectively held as identical through a great variety of immediate expressions, but I intend that this thought of mine should be an expression of a truth which would remain true even if I, this individual, did not think of it. In this sense my thought is essentially imitative. Nor can it ever become reflective unless it first tries to be imitative. As a fact, as I shall show you in a moment, we come by the problem of reflection, by the question, Who am I? by a road which is essentially one of imitation. What we primarily endeavor, as socially disposed beings, to do, is to make our own thoughts agree with the manifested thoughts of our fellows, whose existence we believe in before we even learn to recognize our own existence. Our fellows, however, by sign, by word, and by all their efforts to educate us, attract our attention to the external physical world. Trying to imitate our fellows, we gradually get the idea of the objective world of universal truth, which all observers must imitate in the same way. Gradually, furthermore, we are led, through our very efforts to imitate, to the point where we begin to reflect; and thus it is that our problem of reflection itself arises. The lesson is that, just as we learn only through imitation the very existence of ourselves, so the solution of the problem of self-consciousness can only be reached by defining the Self as the Being whose life consists in imitating truth on the one hand, and on the other hand of being imitated as himself the principle and the very essence of the world of truth. In other words, the very essence of self-consciousness is such that no finite being can answer the problem, Who am I? except by saying: 'I am one who look for myself in something other than what I now am.' while, on the other hand, nobody can thus look for himself beyond himself without all the time asserting: 'I am in truth united with an ideal Self whose whole life consists in surrendering himself for the purpose of being imitated by finite selves, while his own being is identical with that of the whole world of truth.'

"Turning to purely empirical considerations, belonging in the main to the realm of psychology, it is at all events interesting to see how large a part our character as men, who are essentially imitative animals, plays in the natural history of human knowledge. Aristotle, in his Poetics, explicitly recognized the far-reaching importance of the imitative functions in the life of man, and used them as furnishing the basis of his doctrine of art. Ever since, psychologists have more or less fully recognized the prevalence of imitation in human mental life. But, after all, how little seems to have been done toward analyzing the psychological mechanism of the imitative functions! Of late the study of hypnotism has afresh called attention to phenomena which belong in the region of the imitative functions, and which involve a surprising revelation of the plasticity of the human individual under certain curious conditions. Yet, as M. Tarde, the eminent French writer on psychological and sociological topics, pointed out in consequence of a suggestion of Taine's and early in the history of the hypnotic researches, hypnotism

in a large measure but illustrates for us under relatively extraordinary conditions the most familiar fact that lies at the basis of all social life—the fact that the human subject is essentially a suggestible, a socially plastic an imitative being. It is the conditions of the hypnotic experiment that are extraordinary; the suggestibility involved is in its principle a matter of daily observation. As M. Tarde remarked, what the hypnotic experimenter is to the sleeping subject, that is society to the waking man. This observation of M. Tarde has also influenced the recently published revised edition of a monograph by Sgr. Scipio Sighele, the Italian criminologist, entitled *La Foule Criminelle*, where the author, undertaking to explain in a measure the phenomena of the psychology of mobs, has used not only the facts of hypnotism but also those of the social imitations of all grades and classes, as furnishing analogies for the phenomena discussed in his book. Meanwhile, however, the psychological literature on imitation which Sgr. Sighele himself has brought together serves to remind us only the more obviously of the present inadequacy of our insight into the precise mechanism of this whole class of human functions. The brief treatment of the topic in Prof. James's *Psychology*, and the still more summary suggestions in Wundt's *Vorlesungen ueber Menschen und Thierseele*, also show how large and attractive this comparatively unknown realm of human psychology is. The highly important but still somewhat obscure theory of the relations of the '*Gesamtwille*' and the individual will in Wundt's *Ethik* bears in a highly stimulating way upon the same general topic. Quite recently Prof. Baldwin, our well-known American psychologist, has begun extremely promising researches in the psychology of imitation, and has published some important studies bearing upon the origin and the development of the imitative functions.

"Meanwhile, in the midst of all our ignorance, what results from even the most superficial study of the phenomena of our countless human social groups, whether these be the mobs of Sgr. Sighele's monograph or the organized nations of the world; from the study, too, of such social products as language, art, popular morality, religion, in their influence upon the minds of individual men; and from a consideration, in still another region, of the phenomena of hypnotism and of suggestion generally—what does result, I say, from all this, even in advance of better psychological comprehension of the true mechanism of our imitative motor functions, is the principle that positively all the natural life of our individual thinking about the universe and about the things in it is, on one side, the product of a sort of social suggestion, the embodiment of man's submissiveness to authority. Whatever ought to be the case, the natural human being does not primarily get the contents of his beliefs either from his own independent thinking or from what he has a right to regard as his personal interpretation of his own experience. He gets his beliefs by the imitation of the authority of his fellows, in so far as he finds the society of certain among them fascinating, the personalities of these his beloved guides impressive, their companionship indispen-

sable, their approval satisfying, their institutions majestic, their faiths soul-compelling. In one sense, to be sure, this dependence of the natural man on authority for the contents of his beliefs is very generally recognized by students of human nature. What psychologists, however, have failed sufficiently to take into account, what too many philosophers have still more signally omitted to recognize, is the result that is thus indicated concerning the fundamental presuppositions or assumptions of the natural intelligence. Despite this universal prevalence of social authority in one aspect of all our early thinking, it is too customary for psychologists and philosophers to regard man as if, after all, he first developed as a more or less self-conscious being, and then secondarily came to regard others besides himself as being also self-conscious persons. As a fact, however, while in the end the developed social consciousness, while my mature ideas of myself and my mature ideas of other selves (of my fellows, or of my guides, or of my enemies)-while both of these groups of ideas, I say, are inseparable constituents of rational life, so that the Ego can only be understood in relation to other Egos, and the other Egos can only be known by me in relation to my idea of myself, it is still true that in the order of development, *quoad nos*, one of these two classes of ideas, which are later so inseparable, is always one step in advance of the other. And, oddly enough, everything in the psychology of childhood and of the natural man indicates that it is not, as usually supposed, my idea of myself that is in advance in my own development, but my idea of other selves. Everything, I say, indicates that my idea of myself, as empirical Ego, is, on the whole, a social product, due, strangely enough, to my ideas of other people. Self-consciousness, as Hegel loved to point out, is, in fact, always a mutual affair. *Es ist ein Selbstbewusstsein für ein Selbstbewusstsein.* The idea 'I' is inseparable from the idea 'you.' I am, on the whole and in every definite aspect of my self-consciousness, I, in so far as I appeal to my fellow to recognize me. For example, I believe, and in believing conceive myself as demanding the approval of good judges; I esteem myself, and in so doing conceive myself as esteemed by others. But now it is further true, as Hegel did not rightly or sufficiently recognize that, in the order of my natural development, the one member of this inseparable pair, the 'I' and the 'you,' the one member, I say, that is always one step in advance in the process of consciousness is the so-called second member-the 'you.' The anthropological side of the speculations of Fichte will never become sound, from the psychological point of view, until they are some day rewritten with 'Das Du' instead of 'Das Ich' as the principle of developing human life. In the absolute order of Nature, *das Ich* is indeed in advance, since were not man from the start implicitly self-conscious he would never become explicitly such. But in the order of the phenomenology of consciousness I in general learn to notice about myself that which my fellows have taught me to notice. I learn who I am by first imitating what they are. And so I really, if vaguely and dimly, believe in my fellows before I learn

explicitly to believe in myself. In their will is my earnest peace, and in this pace my own strength grows, until I later learn to strive by myself. Imitation is the primary, originality the secondary, submission is the earlier, rebellion the later, authority is the natural, reflective independence the derived element in the social and in the cognitive life of man. If one dared to translate into falsely abstract speech the inner life of the nervously growing childish or savage self, one would find it reasoning not 'C_{og} zto, . agO sum,' but 'You are, you, my master, my warrior, comrade, chief, my fascinating fellow, my mother, my nurse, my big brother ; you think, I can learn to think after you, and so, even as you are it must be that I am.' This, I say, is the order of the natural evolution of self-consciousness roughly translated into terms that are confessedly too abstract, but that do, I believe, embody the spirit of the process. And it is this fact which, on the whole, justifies Wundt's insistence, above referred to, upon the Gesamntwille as the primary fact of the human practical consciousness—a fact to which the individual self-will is secondary. The definite concept of the Ego has, in each one of us, a social and imitative origin.

"The p_{roof} of this proposition is of the most manifold character. I have here no time to dwell upon the empirical aspect of the matter at length. But let me suggest a very simple analytical proof. Let me ask you to try the experiment of seeking for a moment to abstract in thought from all the knowledge whose content you have some time or other accepted, and first accepted, from other people. You will at once observe that all the knowledge embodied for you in the words, the structure, and all the essential traditions of your mother tongue and of every other language that you know, will at once vanish. In other words, as pure and naked private Ego you will be speechless. Language, as you first learned it, was never, for your consciousness, your independent invention. Always, even where you were actually original in speech, you were trying at the outset to speak as other people spoke. Well, nOV, nearly all our thinking, not only about the non-Ego, but also about the Ego, is notoriously carried on in language. I believe that there does unquestionably exist a wordless thought, although that too needs as its support imitatively acquired symbolic acts of another sort ; but wordless thought aside, nearly all our thinking is done in language. Well, if so, this, I say, surely applies also to our thoughts about ourselves. Are these thoughts explicit, then they are very largely embodied in language which we have learned from others, and have first been taught by others to apply to ourselves. For example, 'I exzst.' Yes, indeed: but how came I by this idea of existence? Should I have this idea, as such, in my consciousness if I had not the word, or some equivalent symbol? And when I first learned the meaning of that symbol, I learned it by tlying to imitate what I all the while took to be the thought of another man. Had I not been imitative, I should never have got the thought from him. He taught me to recognize what existence is. Later I learned, and again probably through social suggestion,

say by reading Descartes, to apply that idea to myself. The question, of course, is not now of the certainty, but of the origin for me, of the thought 'I exist.' I insist : This thought I do indeed verify by my own inner reflection; but it first took its origin for me in social intercourse with my fellows. Had they never taught me that I exist, I should never have come to take note of the now so obvious fact. Just so with the still more derived and empirical ideas that make up my idea of myself as this particular person. 'I am a man.' Yes, but what is a man? Have I not learned what a man is by observing my fellows, and by later accepting their traditions as to the nature, office, dignity, rights, duties, capacities, place, and destiny of manhood. These traditions I may indeed learn to revise; but the revision comes later. It has its time, and when its time comes, such revision may be for me of the most absolute significance. But I am here speaking still of the origin, not of the validity, of our self-knowledge. And I may say again : Abstract from all the content that directly or indirectly you first learned from others, and were thus first taught to apply to yourself, and you will abstract from all the ideas concerning yourself that you can now express in language; from all ideas of dignity, of worth, of truth, of duty, as applied to your person; yes, from all ideas of any explicit personal characteristic or possession of your own. For all these ideas, as definite conscious insights, have come to you as results of your social intercourse. Abstract from all these, however, and there would remain, as the core of your idea of yourself, not the *cogito, ergo sum*, not the proud sense, *I am free*, not even the empty identity, *I am I*, but at most a barren and barbarous longing for something that you now know to be self-consciousness, but that, in your isolation, you would know only as an idiot now knows it. So, then, my conscious idea of myself is derived, is secondary, for instance, to language, to which all my thinking is so deeply indebted, and is thus, oddly enough, a product of social intercourse. Who I am I have first learned from others before I can observe it for myself.


"We blind ourselves too often to these considerations by reason of a very artificial theory that is customary in popular and often in technical psychologies concerning the origin of our belief in the existence of our fellows. Many imagine this belief to be due to a process of induction from a single case—an induction whereby each man of us first, as it were, supposing himself to be alone in a still dead physical world, says to himself : 'I exist, having this body, I exist, too, in a world of real physical things. Now, in my external world there are bodies that move very much as mine does. Therefore they—these other bodies—must also be alive and self-conscious as I am.'

"But whoever imagines this extremely artificial and fictitious mental process to be the reasoning of an infant has surely failed to make proper use of even the most superficial observation of the imitative function in its early developments. The infant usually begins explicitly to imitate just before or during the last quarter of the first year of its life. Long before this time,

however, it has shown, as every observant mother knows, an interest in persons wholly different from the interest that it shows in other things. This interest is doubtless in part due to its deep experience of the importance of the persons of its environment for its welfare. They feed it, and supply all its other bodily comforts. By mere association it, of course, thus learns to regard their faces and movements as peculiarly noteworthy objects. But that, in addition to these results of mere association, there is a genuinely instinctive disposition in the infant—the instinctive disposition of the being destined to social life, the disposition to react to persons as it reacts to no other objects—this I can not doubt. The child's interest in expressions of face, its subtle unconscious responses to the moods and to the current general nervous conditions of its nurse or mother, its delights and later its terrors in the contemplation of strange persons—these things go far beyond what the mere association of ideas can warrant or explain. Instinct begins the social life—instinct that leads to responses of the keenest interest in persons, in advance of a time when the child can have any clear idea either of itself or of anybody else, as a conscious Self, or as a person at all.

"Then comes explicit imitation—an unquestionably complex process—in which several different instinctive factors are most subtly interwoven with the effects of experience in a way which psychology, as I have said, still but very ill comprehends. The child is now not only fascinated with the faces and movements of its elders. It tries to do what these elders do. The very uncertainty of its attempts shows how small an idea it yet has of itself or of its own powers.

Its consciousness in this early stage must be of the vaguest. But it surely must feel somehow that here are most attractive objects whose doings incite what we, the observers, call its own activities in such wise that the incited activities are observed ere long, and with great delight, to agree with the observed activities of the attractive objects themselves. But the activities imitated are not only interesting. They are, in general, for the beings who display them to the child, more or less intelligent activities. They are such activities as pointing out things, holding things up to be looked at or played with, using tools, pronouncing the names of things, or putting things together or taking them apart in ways such as reveal the qualities of the things themselves. As the infant slowly learns to imitate he therefore also learns much more than to imitate. The intelligent



J. CLARK MURRAY,
a contributor to the Congress.

activities imitated become, in the very act of imitating them, more or less intelligible to the child. Through his imitations he gets ideas of things--of the nature, for instance, of his playthings, or of the tools that he tries to employ--ideas that alone he could never have got. Now I affirm that these new ideas of things which he gets as he imitates--these intelligent and intelligible aspects which the activities imitated come to possess for him--that all these, I say, are from the first, for the child, new ideas that he tends to refer to the perceived organisms of the people whom he imitates, and little or not at all to what we call himself. For these new ideas come to him as; embodying the meaning, the intelligible value, the purport, of the acts of which he is taught to imitate. But these acts are the acts of the beings imitated. The new ideas, therefore, tend from the outset to be thought of as their ideas. And so the order of the growth of the child's knowledge that there are minds here about him, behind these faces, is substantially this: Here in his world he perceives fascinating beings. It is not needful to suppose that he perceives them explicitly as beings in what we call the external world. The distinction between outer and inner is still, at best, only half developed in his mind. But he at least perceives these beings as facts imposed upon him; and he perceives, too, that they are fascinating. These beings act, and the child at length finds his own body imitating the acts of these beings, and takes delight in the knowledge of the agreement. But all this is largely the result of instinct. So far there is no clear thought either of Self or of other Selves. How could there be? The child so far knows not minds as such, but only what we now call objects. Even these he knows not as they are later to be known--i. e., as explicitly external objects. He perceives their interesting characters and their behavior. - Among these interesting objects is, of course, his own body, which pleases and pains him so often. And now, as a fact, there also those fascinating other objects whom we call persons. Well, the child's own body is perceived to imitate these fascinating guides. The child learns to play, to show things, to point at things, and later to speak of things and to use things as tools, and, as he does so (here is the essential matter), the child gets an endless flux of new and unexpectedly intelligible ideas about his world--ideas that are themselves the inseparable accompaniment and meaning of these very imitated activities. All these ideas, I say, the child, by mere association, must relate to the perceived beings whose intelligible activities he has been imitating when he gets the ideas. This game is papa's game. I play it as child, and so get new ideas that I at once associate with my father's face, voice, and whole body. That tool is the gardener's shears, and when I get hold of the shears I cut too, and so learn that clipping with the shears involves what I now take to be essentially the gardener's idea. The being whose activity, when I learn to imitate it, embodies for me such and such ideas is observed by me to have these ideas. The association is irresistible. Where else do the new ideas belong except to the perceived being who obviously suggests

them. But a person, for the child, comes to mean just such a body of ideas associated with the functions of one particular perceived organism. And it is thus, I affirm, through such imitation that a child learns what a person is.

" But thus it may well come to pass that the child long knows other persons far better than he consciously recognizes himself. Yes, this is in fact inevitable. A person, I insist, is a possessor of a body of definite ideas. And the child, being almost wholly without definite initiative and steady independent purpose of his own, and long remaining in this state, gets nearly all the activities which for him can embody intelligible plans, by means of imitations. Left to himself, he is on the whole a chaos, that plans' accomplishes, and thinks nothing in particular. His steady plans are all imitative plans, and he delights in them as such. Accordingly, his self-consciousness is, in the main, a vicarious selfhood. He concerns himself as another. He thinks and speaks in the characters of the beings whom he most loves to imitate. For the idea won in the course of an imitative act is, for the conscious imitator, an idea that originally belongs to and dwells in the interesting being imitated. The order of the child's reasoning about the minds of other beings is thus the precise reverse of the order supposed by the artificial theory before mentioned. The father, the gardener, and later the hero of a fairy tale, become real persons for the child, not because they move as the child has already observed himself to move, but because the imitative child finds himself disposed to act as they act, and in carrying out this disposition wins intelligible ideas which he at once refers to them, and which he makes his own only by first regarding them as originally another's.

" Hence, I repeat, the child may, and in fact must, conceive far more clearly of the reality of the mind of even a fictitious being in an interesting fairy tale, or in an established game that he plays, than he does of his own individual mind as such. For the latter, in so far as it is his own mind, is for him relatively planless and contentless. Therefore, nearly every child, in his moments of cheerful intellectual life, conceives himself as almost any one - a coachman, a horse, a giant, a fairy, a king, a bird - rather than as what we regard as his literal Self; and he knows himself chiefly in terms of such imitated play personalities. Even his more prosaic moments are still full of an affected selfhood, just at the very points when he most nearly approaches self-consciousness. At one time he is 'mamma's boy,' and accordingly behaves sentimentally as such. Or again he becomes a 'big boy,' and struts imitatively. Or he wants pity, and then deliberately poses as a 'tired boy,' imitates weakness, is artificially babyish. When, however, he is wholly naïve, as when he suffers or is angry, then he simply drops all attempts at self-consciousness, and is busy not with himself at all, but with the merely immediate experience - i. e., his pain or his passion. Then to be sure we observers talk of the narrow selfishness, the egoism of childhood; but this egoism is now far from implying self-consciousness.

" I have dwelt perhaps too long on the child's case. What I want is to

illustrate the essentially vicarious character of the primitive self-consciousness. Strange as the assertion seems, I am convinced that each one of us believed in the existence of other minds before he became conscious of his own mind as such. And for all our life I hold this to be true—namely, that we do not get at the existence of the minds of our fellows by an induction from our own individual case, nearly as much as we make use of precisely the reverse line of reasoning. I do not often say to myself, when thinking of my fellows: 'Yonder people behave as I do; hence they must be alive as I am.' The normal social consciousness runs rather thus: 'When I imitate these people, when I get under the influence of their suggestions, listen receptively to their words, follow their gestures, conform to their customs, accept their authority—well, then I constantly get new ideas, and these new ideas are as such the revelations of yonder minds. But now, as this result proves, I am capable of getting these ideas. Hence I am as much a real person, as truly a thinker, as they are.' In this way it is that I explicitly attain my self-consciousness.

"Our private self-consciousness, as a fact, needs this constant reassurance of its power to share the common intelligence, in order to support its own assurance of itself. When I utterly fail for a while to comprehend my fellows, I begin to wonder whether, after all, I am not myself mad. Self-confidence is always a dependent affair. We can only choose whether our dependence shall be rational or capricious. Self-consciousness needs constantly renewed draughts of that water of life, the imitated authority of other minds. Your vainest man is the one who, despite his explicit independence of the opinions of others, can least bear the shock of criticism from his fellow. Your wisest man is the one whose self-consciousness is most dependent upon his knowledge that the contents of his most original thinking are but recombinations of material that he first got by an imitation of authority.

"But, as a fact, the social order calls us in the end, not only to imitation, but to self-possession. In time we do learn to reflect. The question then returns again as to the nature of this our derived self-consciousness, and as to what is its proper interpretation of the world whose very existence it has first accepted largely as a matter of authority.

"If I have been right as to the origin of self-consciousness, then our own private self-consciousness will be found energizing itself in forms which still are in their whole structure, as in their origin, essentially imitative.

"In fact, then, as Hume says, and as Yl.jnavalkya agrees in saying, I never find myself as object in the inner life. The problem of reflection is, however, How, then, can I find myself as the Subject, as the Knower? The answer is, for the first, this: Primarily I do not find myself as the Knower at all. I find at the outset somebody else as the Knower, and am trying imitatively to conform to this Knower's authority. My effort to think is determined by the ought of the imitative instinct. I in the beginning ex-

ist only as guided. The only person I know, and him but dimly, is my guide.

"Later, in the history of consciousness, my imitative instinct generalizes itself. The external world, the world of truth, comes to be conceived as something more impersonal. As a fact, however, the categories of this external world of truth have themselves an essentially social origin and determination. The external World is the world that all the observers, or at least all the truly wise guides, agree in conceiving thus or thus ; it is the world of truth that is impersonal only because all the persons whom I have learned to imitate describe it to me in the same way, while I myself, when I verify their imitations by my own immediate experience, come, so far as I proceed on this track, to the same imitative results as they. Meanwhile, there is no definition of the external or impersonal truth higher than to say that it is the truth as the highest, the normal, the standard person would imitate or impart it ; so that all our inquiries into this truth are efforts on our part to imitate such an ideal observer. So far, then, the work of my knowledge is an effort to imitate, either my fascinating human social guides or a certain ideal and unindividual Guide who is none the less a person, to my conception, because I identify him, the standard guide, with no one of my fallible actual guides.

"Meanwhile, when I come more and more nearly to self-consciousness, another aspect of the matter also appears. I am, in time, not only guided ; I also gradually learn to guide, and once more by imitation. As father, as teacher, as leader of my fellows, and, finally, as person of individual initiative in general, I learn in my turn the office of imparting guidance, as well as of being guided. Just so, too, I learn to guide my own inner life, to have plans and opinions that my own inner life has to carry out by long and patiently submissive imitative activities, just as my pupils and followers have to do in the social world. But as guide, what self, what person do I best know? Answer : The selves or persons guided. 'Yes,' I say to myself, they meet my mind, they do my will, they imitate me. In them I see myself. In this way, however, my self-consciousness is still vicarious. My inner thoughts that embody my meaning, my faithful followers who do my will-these are the expression and the life of me, and apart from them, as before (when I followed), apart from my guides, I find not yet myself as the pure Subject. In brief, so far I know myself only in so far as my true self is elsewhere than here in my present insight. I know the other selves whom I follow or whom I lead, whom I imitate or who imitate me, whom I want to live up to as my ideal, or who make my plans and my words their ideal. These other Selves may be real outer persons or inner ideals or plans or thoughts of my own, for our inner life is but an epitomized copy and image of the social life, and within my private consciousness I have no categories other than those derived from my social intercourse.

" But this being so, can I ever, any more than Hume or than Yajnaval-

kya, define who the true Self is? I may best answer this question by a brief concluding dialogue with any one of you - a dialogue in which I ask you, for yourselves, to follow me. Let me ask once more of any one of you, 'Who is the Self?' The answer must be : 'The Self is the Knower, for whom and in whom my thoughts have conscious unity and my meanings remain identical amidst their changing embodiments.' 'But what are your thoughts?' 'Efforts to imitate first the thoughts of my fellows, and then, because these thoughts are themselves but fleeting and fallible, efforts to imitate truth.' 'When have your thoughts, then, a meaning?' 'When they aim at or intend the truth.' 'But what is the truth?' 'That which an ideally knowing Self, the observer whom all observers aim to imitate in their meaning, would see, think, know.' 'What, then, once more, is your private Self?' 'I am one who keep my thoughts in unity and retain in the midst of changing embodiments my one meaning only in so far as I imitate some changeless ideal knower of the truth as it is.' 'Do you, then, in so far as you seek knowledge and really think, ever aim to know yourself solely as private Self, as this person here in time and space, changing, ignorant, unideal?' 'No, that knowledge is indeed impossible. I aim to know something, however little, of the true knower and his mind. Whether I succeed or fail, whenever I think of the truth, that is the object of all my thinking, just in so far as it is a sincere striving for truth.' 'Very well, then, could any finite Self as such ever completely know himself as a knower, as subject, while still remaining ignorant of the actual truth of things beyond him?' 'Plainly not. I neither do know, nor, if I am wise, try or desire to know myself merely as finite knower. What I aim to know is myself as I ought to be, my true self, the ideal knower.' 'So then all your finite self-knowledge is vicarious, is imitative. You seek to know yourself as another than what you now ignorantly are?' 'Yes, indeed, and this is true reflection, namely, reflective imitation. There is no other for us in so far as we are finite seekers for truth.' 'But now there is also the other aspect. Do you not often find yourself trying to be a guide to your fellows?' 'Yes.' 'And an ideal Self, if he existed, if he were real, if he had knowledge, he would find himself, would he not, as the guide of the seeking, of the imitating selves?' 'It seems so.' 'He too, then, would he know himself as Yajnavalkya said, without consciousness, because there would be for him no other than himself?' 'No, he would know himself as the guide of these seeking, of these imitative, of these imperfect, yes, of all these finite and fleeting selves.' 'And therein he would know, would he not, the unity, the identity of his meaning in all these fleeting imperfect embodiments of his thought, in so far, namely, as he knew them as imitations of himself?' 'Well then, finally, if so it appears, the solution of Hume's problem for a true and complete self would be, that while possessing all the content of truth in its fullness, he knew the imitative selves as the imitators of himself, while they knew him as the ideal self whom they imitated ; and thus solely in this communion of selves would the self-consciousness of

the world of truth consist. And thus, if the problem of self-consciousness has any solution whatever, such must be the actual constitution of the world of Truth.'

"I conceive, then, that since the external world, the world of what we call the impersonal truth, has to be conceived by us simply as the object of the knowledge of a perfect knower, whom we strive to imitate whenever we strive to know. the final metaphysic must take some such form as this : The whole realm of truth in its immediate, in its experienced aspect, in its character as datum, must be present as the object of his own perfect insight to an absolute, a timeless knower. This truth he, so to speak, first knows. Himself he knows, however, as the object imitated by the individuals of the world of time who are his own finite and imperfect embodiments, and who live in him as the momentary thoughts of any man who guides his own thoughts by his own purposes live in their more fully self-possessed thinking guide. We the finite beings, however, have our true selfhood only in him the guide. Whenever we imitate any ideal, be it a physical truth, or a human authority, or our own conscience, or our inner light, we are actually seeking, whether we know it or not, to find ourselves in him. In the communion of this infinite guide and of his finite followers the true self-consciousness of the universe consists. He dwells in us and we in him whenever we seek for the truth. His selfhood is the infinite self-sacrifice of living only to know and to guide us. Our selfhood we find only in the imitation of his truth."

Among the other papers read at this session were one on the Reconciliation of Science and Philosophy, by Prof. John Dewey, of the University of Michigan ; one on The Debt of the Moderns to Plato, by Thomas M. Johnson, of Osceola, Mo. ; and one on The Ethics of Hegel, by Prof. J. M. Sterrett, of Columbian University.

At the fourth session papers were presented on The Aesthetic Consciousness, by Prof. J. S. Kedney, of Faribault, Minn. ; The Principles of Thomistic Philosophy, by Brother Chrysostom ; Philosophy and Industrial Life, by Prof. J. Clark Murray, LL. D., of McGill College, Montreal; A New Non-tentative and Economic Method of solving Equations, by President J. W. Nicholson, of Louisiana University; and The Significance of the Realistic Movement in Art and Literature, by Louis J. Block, Ph. D., of Chicago. From the last-named we take the following passages :

"The old battle which has appeared in so many shapes is fought again in our own time. Probably it has engaged the courage of the best men and women in every time. Each age, it seems, must win the victory for itself. Error has a thousand forms, and one has only been fairly disposed of when another takes its place, more active than any of its predecessors. The negative we have always with us, and our life consists in its continuous negation. When we have built for ourselves one pleasure house, in which we hope permanently to dwell, we find before long that it is altogether too narrow, and we discover that we make limits for ourselves only to transcend them.