Prefatory note on vocabulary for letter, 1905 Sep 23, Charles Peirce to Josiah Royce

Disquiparance
Most relations concern ordered relations: they are called disquiparances.
1901-1902 [c.] | Definitions for Baldwin's Dictionary [R] | MS [R] 1147

Equiparance
An equiparance is a fact about a set of objects irrespective of their order, such as being together, being alike, being unlike…
1901-1902 [c.] | Definitions for Baldwin's Dictionary [R] | MS [R] 1147

Milford, Pa
1905 Sep 23

My dear Prof. Royce,

At present I have to think of earning money & cannot think of your letters. I thought my hints would suffice to show you your fallacy, but I will interrupt my work to point it out more distinctly.

What you say is that you show how to build up an asymmetrical relation out of symmetrical elements exclusively. Symmetry is the equality of certain parts. Asymmetry an inequality among them. So what you say is that inequality can result from equality and nothing else. You cannot be surprised if I say that this is too Hegelian.

But let us look at the matter from the point of view of my matrix

A:A	A:B	A:C	etc
B:A	B:B	B:C	etc
C:A	C:B	C:C	etc
etc	etc	etc	etc

A:B is the type & origin of all disquiparance, A:A is that of equiparance. In A:A it would be less false, to say that the two As differ from each other in every respect. They are regarded as the same only by neglecting the element of secondness & when that is neglected there no longer is properly any relation. /2/ Therefore even here we see that equiparance is only disquiparance veiled. The reason I used a symmetrical sign, the colon, in this matrix was not that, although it is necessary to distinguish the related from the correlate, yet it is not from that distinction, or from the disquiparance of the relation it marks, as much in A:A as in A:B that the disquiparance of the relation A:B arises. The origin of disquiparances is exhibited in my matrix. It consists in the secondness & unlikeness of the <u>matter</u>. The matter is this brute element that logic leaves out of account, through it much recognize its presence & its brute unlikenesses. This brute element is Secondness. Disquiparance is genuine secondness. Equiparance may arise from every A:B element of a relation being accompanied by B:A. Such equiparance, built out of disquiparances, on being combined with another equiparance (unlike it &* therefore by a disquiparant relation of combination) may result in a disquiparance, thus

$$(A:B + B:A) \ (A:A = (B:A)$$

This simply one of the disquiparant elements that was originally in one or other factors, one is partly from one & partly from the other

$$(A:B + B:A) (A:C + C:A) = (B:C)$$

Where (B:C) is due to the disquiparant elements B:A and A:C. /3/ Thus I not only represented at the outset of my studies that disquiparance results from the difference of matter (difference of matter being a matter of form, that, being something which logic has to take into account) but in showing, as I often have, that disquiparance is the <u>genuine</u> (original), and equiparance only the <u>degenerate</u>, or weakened, form of dyadism, I have usually used notations which exhibit this fact that the whole disquiparance can be thrown back into the matter whence it originates.

Thus in my existential graphs the only signs except the spots, which compose the matter, are writings graphs together on the sheet, uniting tails of spots by line of identity (which express identity only, and the cut, which expresses the equiparant relation of negation. So that I always distinctly said that the origin of genuine secondness was in <u>experiencing</u>. But equiparance is nothing but eviscerated disquiparance. Disquiparance cannot be built out of equiparant elements along. For the only <u>pure</u> equiparances are of the forms A:A, A:A + B:B, A:A + B:B + C:C, etc. (Only A:A is quite pure.)

Mr. Kempe though he had built a disquiparance out of /4/ equiparant elements alone. But Kempe as a mathematician could not be expect to be trained in the analysis of conceptions. He gave this graph



Here he says is a disquiparance between  and  composed of mere linkages. True, but I need not tell him there are two kinds of linkages in his graph. Those marked & those left unmarked. Representing the unmarked one by marks & the unmarked one by the absence of marks, the graph remains the same but with this dress which better exhibits its true structure.

The fact that the disequiparant relation between  and  is disequiparant because of the matter of the two things linked have becomes evident.

Your $F(x\beta|\gamma z)$ also expresses a disquiparant selection between x and z. What you imagine there is about this that is not a familiar phenomenon in dyadic relations it is hard to see. The only difference from Kempe's graph 9uless we look to the matter of the relations which makes your contention /5/ much more evidently weak) is that you have joined the brown and blue spots (β and γ) by a different sort of link. The following graph exhibits all there is in the form.



Observe this a disquiparance between x and z, but it is evidently due to the matter and evidently is not composed of equiparances at all. For unless you take into account the difference between β and γ it is not a disquiparant relation; and if you <u>do</u>, it is composed of disquiparances.

If we look at the substance of the relations, $F(x\alpha|\beta y)$ means that in whatever respect x disagrees with y while there is no agreement between α and β, either x agrees with some element <u>contained in</u> β or y agrees with some element <u>contained in</u> α — I don't think I should have any difficulty in persuading logicians that the relation between x and y herein asserted is not composed exclusively of equiparant elements.

Ever very faithfully
C. S. Peirce

I will get at your letter just as soon as I can, I am only [corner torn off].

/6/ P. S. To sum up, what I assert to be the fallacy iof every attempt to show that an unsymmetical relation of out symmetrical relations exclusively, 9apart from the manifest absurdity of the claim) is that the relation so built up is only unsymmetical provided certain differences between the terms are recognized, but if these differences are recognized the elements lose their symmetrical character.

A pretty near equal to b x c

b is pretty near equal to b'

c is pretty near equal to c'

b' and c' is pretty near equal to D

Yet A is not anywhere near equal to D

Marvellous! [sic]