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
## Royce's Urbana Lectures: Lecture I

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Nous avons déjà dit que la nécessité que nous avons d'user de signs extérieurs pour nous faire entendre, fait que nous attachons tellement nos idées aux mots, que souvent nous considérons plus les mots que les choses. (CG 83)

Our need to use external signs to make ourselves understood makes us bind our ideas so closely to words that often we attend more to the words than to the ideas expressed. (DJ 78)

We have already said that the necessity which we have for employing outward signs in order to make ourselves understood, causes us so to attach our ideas to words, that we often consider the words more than the things. (B 76)

RICHARD A. WATSON

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### ROYCE'S URBANA LECTURES: LECTURE I

In 1907, Josiah Royce gave a series of lectures on moral philosophy at the University of Illinois in Urbana. Four of these lectures, the first two of which are complete and extensively edited by the author, are preserved in the Harvard University Archives. On a piece of brown wrapping paper attached to the lectures, Royce wrote: "These lectures to be worked over for a book on 'Loyalty and Personality.'" The book was never written, although much of the material in the third and fourth lectures appeared in revised form in *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908). The first two Urbana lectures, most of whose content never appeared in published form, are reproduced in their entirety below.

A careful correlation of Royce's published and unpublished writings reveals that his mature ethical theory has a multidimensional structure. Three phases or levels are distinguishable: (1) A "precritical" phase in which Royce examines the initial experiential situation in which we find ourselves when we predicate values and encounter value-conflicts. This phase marks Royce's attempt to define a formal or procedural moral attitude and to elucidate certain principles regulative of moral discourse in general, prior to the effort to determine critically substantive principles of moral value and moral obligation as such. (2) A "self-realizational" phase in which Royce attempts to show that the individual moral agent appeals to a principle of self-realization as criterion of what is morally good and obligatory for him. (3) A "communal" phase in which the principle of self-realization is embodied in a social context. While these three phases overlap to some extent, Royce makes clear that distinctive modes of moral argumentation and justification pertain to each of them.

The first of the Urbana lectures confines itself almost exclusively to what I have called the precritical phase.<sup>1</sup> The main burden of Royce's analysis is to show that in the face of interpersonal value-conflicts mere considerations of prudence are sufficient to lead individuals with a modicum of enlightened self-interest to perceive the need to regulate their quest for personal gratification by the adoption of certain procedural principles of conduct, consistent adherence to which tends in the long run to mitigate conflict and thereby to further the interests of all parties concerned. Royce distinguishes four such procedural principles: reasonableness, impartiality, respect for persons *qua* persons, and the harmonization of conflict. He emphasizes that it is not the purpose of these principles to appraise value claims directly. Instead, their role is to spell out feasible procedures for human interaction in the very face of irreducibly conflicting value claims.

In the second lecture, Royce launches into the self-realizational phase of his mature ethical

<sup>1</sup> For a critical discussion of this phase, see my *The Moral Philosophy of Josiah Royce* (Harvard University Press: 1965), ch. 6. For further discussion of the material in the second Urbana lecture, see ch. 7.

theory. In a continuing effort to reconcile the traditional demands of personal autonomy with those of moral objectivity and universality, Royce argues that whereas the moral agent necessarily determines what is valuable and right for him by reference to the more or less coherent development of his own life plan or purpose, that life plan or purpose is itself largely the result of a spontaneous internalization of models of self-fulfillment provided by his social environment. Of special noteworthiness are several corollaries which Royce draws from the tension he perceives to exist between the individual's social docility and his personal uniqueness. The individuality of persons entails that, concretely speaking, no two of them can ever have exactly the same moral obligations. There can be no such thing as a fully codified body of moral law binding equally and in the same manner on all moral agents. Interpersonal moral judgments are valid only to the extent that they are in conformity with the idealized life plan actually or latently chosen by the addressee of those judgments himself. Royce's consistency in maintaining these corollaries is one of the hallmarks of his moral philosophy, just as his distinction between procedural and substantive moral principles, along with his discrimination of levels of moral argumentation and discourse, strikingly anticipate developments in contemporary ethical theory.

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### *The Problem of Ethics*

There are two ways to study the world. One way is to try to find out what things there are in the world. The other way is to attempt to discover the values of things.

The first way of studying the world is exemplified by the natural sciences. The second way is the one of which I wish to give some illustrations in the lectures which are to follow. I propose, in these lectures, to study, with you, some of the values which are possessed by our human conduct. The branch of inquiry which deals with the values of conduct is called Ethics. It is a department of philosophy, and, like the rest of philosophy, it consists in an effort to use our reason, as best we can, for the sake of seeing for ourselves the truth about the matters which are in question. These matters are here the moral values of our conduct.

## I

Inquiries concerning what things there are in the world differ from inquiries regarding the values of things in a number of notable ways, some of which I may as well try to state to you at the outset. You are aware that, when one begins the study of any natural science, he indeed does so because he believes, or is at least assured, that there is some worth for him, and for humanity, about the knowledge of the facts which he is to examine. Every science, then, presupposes that its investigations have value; and without our belief in certain values, there would be no scientific inquiries whatever. But, despite this fact, you expect to read, in any textbook of science, a great deal more about the nature of the things studied in that science than you can find in that book about their values. Even textbooks of technology, even treatises on a practical art such as medicine, have, in general, little to say about those very values that give to their art its practical significance. A book on the strength of materials, or any engineer's manual, instructs the student about what he needs to know for purposes which

are indeed practical enough; but such books usually spend little of their space in explaining why the engineer's tasks are valuable to mankind or to the engineer himself. In preparing such a book, one simply presupposes the alert inquirer, who has undertaken some task because he has already thought it worthwhile to do so. One therefore lays little stress upon an account of the values which alone justify the whole undertaking. One devotes the text to the facts and to the rules of the art themselves. Similarly, when you open the medical treatise, you there find little about the blessings of health. The book treats of diseases almost as if they were matters of independent interest, and studies them as devotedly as the astronomer scrutinizes stars, or as the collecting entomologist examines butterflies, or as the physiologist investigates the normal functions of the organism.

Every natural science, then, and every technical study, presupposes that its investigations have value, but seldom makes the definition and analysis of that value any explicit object of the technical inquiry itself. It is the rule that, if you want to know facts, and to read the secrets of nature, you must work disinterestedly, and therefore must forget, for the time, all your private scruples as to whether the investigation has indeed the worth which those who love it attribute to it. And for that very reason the study of the things of the world has, in the main, to be carried on without any conscious dependence upon your ideas regarding the values of these things. The geometer has no theorems which assert anything about the beauty of triangles; and even the most aesthetically fascinating curve is for him a locus, a class of points, an equation exemplified. The pathologist ignores the loathsomeness of morbid growths, in order to consider their genesis and their structure. The engineer plans bridges, much as heaven sends the rain, for the sake alike of the just and of the unjust. To examine facts and laws, to calculate and to control them, such tasks involve mental attitudes which are opposed, in our narrow minds, to a conscious dwelling upon the worth of things. Hence we generally ignore values so long as we scrutinize facts.

The goal of all sciences and arts which thus deal with things, rather than with values, is the precise and complete description of the facts and the processes of the world. The methods used are those of attentive observation, of precise record, of exact conception, of skillful hypothesis, of well-reasoned theory, and of a fair and close comparison of theory and fact. The work is done so far as facts are correctly reported, classified, computed, and predicted. The standard of success is set by human experience. Private opinion is constantly submitted to publicly accessible tests. The question always is, not "What does this man need, or desire, or hope?" but "What can all men, in common, find?" The inquirer into facts reasons, but only in order to submit his reasonings to the control of the general experience. He is fond of things; but only for the sake of the interests of his science. He grows enthusiastic; but his enthusiasm is not for his own personal satisfactions as such, but for the discoveries which belong, when once they are made, to humanity as a whole. Especially can the inquirer into the world of facts point with confidence to the exactness of his tests. In the world

of facts the thing is so or is not so. Experience decides. Given the opportunity for the test, private judgment passes away like a dream. The descriptive sciences pursue an ideal which demands a rigid sacrifice of personal prejudice, and of private valuation.

So much, then, for the task of the student of external things. The student of values occupies from the outset a decidedly different and, in some ways, a more dangerous position. Things have values from the point of view of persons. A person is a being with a will of his own. It is because of his will that, for him, values exist at all. The world of values and the world of wills are logically inseparable. If nobody wanted anything, the suns and the milky ways, the oceans and the weather, the organisms and their diseases,—if indeed all these things could exist at all in a will-less world,—would come and go, would grow and decay, would arise and cease, without worth,—valueless and, I may add, meaningless. A person in a fact-world is like a light in a room. Facts without persons are empty of significance, as the dark room is empty of visible meaning. Darkness would indeed be upon the face of the deep, if there were no persons. But let there be the light of personality in the universe, and then suddenly all the facts together cry out: We have values!

Well, without persons, no values. And so the student of values has to begin and to end his task with the study of personality. But to be sure, as you may here well reply, persons also are themselves facts; and you may therefore at first suppose that the student of values will merely attempt the description of a new type of facts, namely the facts about our personal valuations of things. A good many modern students of the theory of values have in fact maintained the view that the only proper business of any doctrine of values must be just the treatment of men's opinions about good and evil, about right and wrong, about the noble and the base, about beauty, and about whatever other values men may conceive,—the treatment of all these opinions, I say, as coolly and disinterestedly as any science treats its own facts. The theory of values would simply describe, classify and reduce if possible to psychological laws, these opinions. Such students maintain that you may indeed express, if you will, and however you will, your own personal valuations of things. But, say they, to do this would not be to create anything resembling a science, or a reasoned doctrine. It would be merely to furnish one more fact for the science of values to study. If you propose to study values seriously, scientifically, rationally, you must, like other students of science, (so these men say), you must treat your facts just as facts, collect, describe, unify them. And, as these people continue, the theory of value has, for its facts, simply the valuations which men express, by word and by deed, as the men deal with things. Man is, indeed, a creature with valuations. The theory of values is the report and description of these valuations, precisely as they occur, together with whatever study is possible of their physical and psychological conditions.

This, I say, is the view of not a few modern students of our topic. The reasons why I do not agree with such a view will, in part, appear in what follows in these lectures. I do indeed believe that there is such a thing as a scientific psychologi-

cal study of the opinions of men about the values of things, and that such a study has indeed for its object all the accessible facts regarding what values men actually set upon things, be these valuations wise or foolish, right or wrong, savage or civilized. I admit all this, and nevertheless I hold that there is also a place for a reasoned and philosophical account of the true values which persons ought to attach to themselves, to their conduct, and to their world. I also hold that this philosophical account of the true values of our life cannot be worked out by merely noting what values this or that man, or community, or nation, or race, at any moment, or at any number of stages of evolution, may actually ascribe to persons, to things, and to conduct. When men set values upon things, they do so either rightly or wrongly. I cannot find out the right valuation by merely reporting the opinions of men, or even by studying the psychology of our consciousness of values. It is with valuation in general as it is with reasoning. When you reason, you reason either correctly or incorrectly. But we cannot find whether a conclusion actually follows from given premises by merely studying the psychological phenomena that go on in the minds of various thinkers when they try to reason. Nor can logic, which is the doctrine of what constitutes the right way of thinking, be founded upon a mere report of the actual facts furnished by the conflicting views of different men and nations and races concerning the question whether given premises do or do not warrant a given conclusion. Logic is no part of the science of anthropology; that is, logic is no mere effort to report facts about the thoughts of men; although anthropology, if exhaustive, will certainly include a study of the actual reasoning processes, the actual efforts to think, which men have carried on. But to tell how men have tried to reason and to think is one thing. To point out how they ought to reason and to think is another task. And the latter task is the one which a student of logic must pursue. Now there actually exists a philosophical logic. It has its own problem; which is to tell how one ought to think and reason. And this undertaking is very different from a mere collection of reports about the actual and blundering efforts which people make when they try to think. Savages think in one way; civilized men learn to think in other ways. But logic has no concern with the mere report of how savages and civilized men think. Logic examines the principles of correct thinking.

Well, precisely so it is, in fact, with the general doctrine of values and of valuations,—a doctrine of which, as a fact, logic itself is a part. The problem of a doctrine of values is this: What valuation ought we to make? What is the correct valuation of these and these things, persons, deeds, thoughts;—yes, what is the true value of life and of the world? Such questions you cannot answer by merely reporting how certain people have valued things, or do now value them. You can only answer the question as to how people ought to value things if you can discover the true standards of value.

## II

In the present discussions I am to undertake a study of a particular sort of values,—that is, a study of the values of our conduct. By conduct I mean de-

liberate action,—such action as we carry on voluntarily. We distinguish such conduct as right or as wrong. Our voluntary conduct is right if it possesses the value that it ought to possess. Otherwise it is wrong. I am to tell you what I believe to be the basis of this distinction between right and wrong, and then I am to draw some conclusions which depend upon this my belief about the nature of right and of wrong.

I said, a moment ago, that the position of a student of values is decidedly different from the position of one who merely describes the things of the world. I also said that the position of the student of values is in some respects more dangerous than is that of the student of external things. You may ask what danger it was to which I thus referred. I now reply: The danger of the position of the student of values is that values, as I said, exist only from the point of persons, while persons themselves are numerous, and various, and, in their valuations of things, disposed to be very conflicting and unstable. The student of values is, however, himself a person, of like passions with his fellows, and of a nature equally disposed, as their natures are, to conflict, to prejudice, and to fickleness. He therefore readily takes, in his study of the world of values, his present estimates for final insight, his private prejudices for rational assurance, his passing conviction for eternal truth. Values are the aspects of reality which lie nearest to us; and yet they are themselves the most elusive of objects. They give to our whole universe its meaning, to our whole life its most essential character; but our hold upon them is so hesitant, that what we want to say about them is especially hard to make final for ourselves, and clear to our fellows. Values must be appreciated by each man for himself. But if you try to convey your idea of them to your fellow, you find the task extremely baffling,—far more so than is the task of the teacher of a descriptive science. If your neighbor or your pupil has time, and interest, and his normal senses, and good reasoning powers, he can follow and verify your description of things very readily. But when you and he try to come into agreement about values, the result may be, not merely failure on his part to understand you, but a certain active hostility which the very effort to discuss the value of things may arouse in both of you. Because of their various valuations of things it is that men quarrel and fight and slay. Intolerance, hatred, war, the scaffold and the stake, the anathema and the breaking of hearts, these are familiar results of the very efforts of men to take counsel with one another concerning the values of things. At the present day, the civilized nations have their descriptive sciences in common; but their national, their religious, and their personal valuations of things still estrange civilized men from one another, still keep the nations armed to the teeth, still burden the souls of many pious men with bitterness, still beset neighborhoods with bickerings, and rend family ties asunder because of the conflicting loves of those whom natural bonds have united. The whole topic then is a dangerous one.

Nevertheless, the effort to reach some sort of rational insight into the true values of things is indeed an ineradicable tendency of the intelligent being. We all of us refuse to accept the view that the values of things are unreal, or that these

values exist only as matters of our private sentiments. We go on insisting that we mean to love what is really worth loving and to hate what is really worthy of hatred. Hence the task of finding the reason for our valuations is indeed dangerous, since it so often leads to strife; but it is also inevitable; for upon the accomplishment of this task reasonable living depends. We find in this task an endless fascination. Daily conversation is full of remarks and of controversies about values, and in particular about the values of conduct. Boys at their play in the streets wrangle over ethical values. The gossips,—even the scandal-mongers,—continually discuss ethical matters. All the good and all the base, if only they are intelligent enough, are devoted to setting forth views about the worth of conduct, and of defending these views.

Now I bring these very matters to your notice here in order to help us on our way towards a serious inquiry into the truth about values. The way to attack a great problem is to recognize from the start its most essential difficulties. If I am to tell you anything about what constitutes the value of conduct, I cannot succeed if I merely report to you my own tastes and sentiments. Nor can I help you by merely making a catalogue of the various views that men have held regarding this question.

On the other hand, the very fact that men hold various views concerning the worth of conduct, and that these views are sincerely held, and are regarded by those who hold them not as the expression of their personal taste, but as the expression of a truth, is of central importance in any attempt to define the solution of the ethical problem.

Let us, then, next ask this question: When I hold that a given course of conduct is the right one, or that conduct has a certain worth, I inevitably express, in the first place, my own point of view. I inevitably state my personal appreciation of some situation in which conduct is involved. If hereupon I am sufficiently in earnest about my opinion, and am sufficiently untrained in reasonableness, my whole attitude may be expressed in the form of an attempt to use force, in order to have my view of right conduct prevail. In this case, I shall oppose my fellow who is not of my opinion, merely by endeavoring to kill him, or to paralyze his physical power to carry out his own will. But if I am upon some more rational level of life, I shall endeavor, at least as a part of my activity, to argue the question with him, to persuade him that my view is right, to show him the truth of the matter. Now the question that I here propose to ask is this: What do I mean by saying to my fellow, that if he rightly views things, he will agree with my opinion about the right and wrong of given conduct? The answer is, for the first, that I may mean, when I say: "My view of the value of this conduct is the true one, and yours is false,"—I may mean simply this, namely, that my fellow and myself have already agreed upon some for us authoritative principle by which, as we both already admit, the value of our conduct is to be tested. In this case there is indeed a perfectly legitimate and obvious basis for a reasoning process, in which we may both engage, and which concerns a matter that in itself is as much a matter of truth or falsity as is a problem in arithmetic. The difference of opinion between us then becomes this:

—My fellow holds that the authority which we already accept demands the approval of one course of conduct. I hold, on the contrary, that this our common authority requires us to value our conduct otherwise. To illustrate the way in which such a difference of opinion may arise by a very obvious case: We may be by agreement engaged in carrying out the instructions of our chief, whose clerks or agents we are. When I say that a given course of action is the right one, and value this course of action accordingly, my meaning may be that I assert that our chief's instructions require this course of conduct. Now by hypothesis we in this case both agree in setting a certain value upon our acts. We both, namely, already agree that the chief's instructions are to be carried out. Our difference of opinion here relates either to the question of fact, with regard to whether or not the chief's instructions are actually what I say that they are; or the question may be one of a reasoning process, whereby I conclude that certain general instructions which our chief has given imply certain consequences which I think to be a logical conclusion from the instructions. In brief, in this case, the question What is right? or the question What value should we set on this conduct? is a question either of fact, or of reasoning,—the question of fact relating to what instructions the chief gave, the question of reasoning relating to what conclusions can logically be drawn from his admitted instruction. In both these cases the problem about the actual value of this conduct is for us a perfectly objective problem. We are talking about values, and we may differ in opinion, and the fact, owing to our ignorance, may remain inaccessible or the reasoning, owing to the complexity of the subject, may remain a doubtful matter. But the problem, even if for us insoluble, is not a problem regarding our private taste, but a problem about a truth which is valid for both of us.

Now a vast number of discussions about moral issues actually take on a form analogous to the one just illustrated. Certain people have already agreed to act in accordance with a certain authority. They disagree as to how this authority should be interpreted, or as to what judgments of value its principles imply. The authority need not be that of an accepted chief. It may be the authority of the church, of a formulated moral code, or even of custom,—as vague a thing as custom often is. In such cases it is surely not vain to reason about the values of conduct, so long as we agree about the principles. An inquiry into what certain principles imply is a perfectly fair and objective inquiry. If successful, it leads us to results which, as far as they go, are true, and which bear upon the values of conduct.

But you will very probably say that the most serious problems of ethics do not arise in this way. It may well be that I say to my fellow: "I am right, and you are wrong," when I do not mean that he has already explicitly accepted some authority, to which we both are ready to appeal. My quarrel with him may be based upon the fact that he does not accept the authority that I think he ought to accept. Perhaps, to use an example that Mr. Arthur Balfour has suggested, my fellow's principles, developed perhaps into a pretty elaborate creed regarding the values of conduct, somehow imply that he should shoot me from behind a hedge whenever he gets an opportunity to do so. Perhaps my fellow's ethical system,

which involves this consequence, is very precisely formulated, and seems to him perfectly consistent. For, as you know, the creeds of certain modern agitators, revolutionists, and anarchists attempt to be both elaborate and consistent in their definitions of principles, and in the conclusions drawn from these principles. Or again, if my fellow is appealing to the authority of custom, the authority to which he appeals may be repellent to me, merely because his customs are not mine. For instance, my fellow may be a member of a tribe of head-hunters. Perhaps a custom requires him, in order to secure a reasonable social position, and a wife, to bring home a certain number of heads and to display them as trophies. Perhaps my head appears to him useful for his possible collection. In such cases, according to Mr. Balfour, both my fellow and I indeed make valuations of conduct. But there is, as Mr. Balfour insists, no longer any room left for reasoning, no longer any place for a difference of opinion that may be rationally settled by an appeal to some objective standard of truth regarding the right valuation of these. The head-hunter, or the revolutionist who proposes to shoot me from behind a hedge, may be as much of a philosopher as you choose to imagine, as fond of truth as any logician, or as any mathematician. He may still defy me to show him the fact that makes his valuation a wrong one. For if each of us persists in asserting: "I am right, and you are wrong," there are, by hypothesis, no explicitly admitted principles to which we, so far, according to Mr. Balfour, are able to appeal in common. There seems to be no resort left but the ancient wager of battle. One of our valuations must survive. Natural selection must determine the case. The only relevant matter of fact for the student of values is, in this case, according to Mr. Balfour, the fact that we differ in valuation.

Now I am indeed far from supposing that the thing to do when you actually meet the head-hunter, or the man behind the hedge, each with his system of valuation, and each with his intent to act out his system,—that the practical thing to do, I say, is to argue with such people. For the question whether or not to philosophize upon the occasion, is itself a practical question. And were the situation such as involved meeting the enemy at the moment when he intended to carry out his will, philosophy would indeed be an unpractical procedure. But, suppose, for a moment, that the head-hunter or the revolutionist suspends his activity, and temporarily proposes, by way of a truce, a consideration of the truth of the matter, an effort to discover quite dispassionately and sincerely whether his views of the value of my head, or of this opportunity to shoot, are due to the right valuation of conduct. In such a case, supposing sufficient intelligence and thoughtfulness upon both sides, and supposing a sufficiently secured truce to make philosophical argument a tolerable occupation, the question still recurs: Is there any reason which, from my point of view, I can still give to my enemy for my assertion that his opinion is wrong, and that my opinion is right?

I need hardly remind you to what rational considerations we should all of us be disposed to appeal, in case the truce, and the philosophical argument, were once agreed upon. Precisely such arguments men have in fact used to one another as civilization has advanced. Men used to kill one another more systematically, and with a more decided sense of the duty of killing, of the rational necessity

that some people must be killed, than it is now customary for thoughtful people to entertain. And reason has actually played its part in bringing about this discouragement of killing. Men's opposing systems of moral opinion have not proved wholly impervious to genuinely novel but thoughtful considerations,—considerations which were somewhat external to the systems themselves and which therefore tended to reform these systems. There is, then, at least a chance that there are principles which my enemy has not yet explicitly accepted, but which I can reasonably bring him to accept, if only I can induce him seriously to consider the true values of life. Let us see. Let us then make a truce, and begin to use reason.

If we do so, what we shall all be disposed to say in opening the supposed argument may be something like this: Why do you want to kill me, when I am not trying to kill you? Should you wish to be treated so yourself if you were in my place? Am I not a human being just as much as you are? Can you recognize me as a man sufficiently to begin an argument with me, unless you recognize that my life has the same kind of value that your life has, namely, the value of somebody who thinks and wills and lives, in essentially the same way in which you think and will and live? Is not the same human life present in both of us? Is not my life dear to me in exactly the same sense in which yours is dear to you? Some such questions the familiar ways of common sense would bring to our lips. They would, as you must see, imply at least an intent to appeal to certain truths about values,—truths which we should conceive as inevitably valid both for our fellow and for ourselves. I need not say that just such considerations would have little or no worth as effective motives for calming our enemy's passion, in case he were simply blindly desirous to kill us. But with passion we indeed do not argue, nor are we now in the least asserting that such an appeal as this would have any interest to our opponent unless he were in fact a decidedly rational being. But our present consideration has nothing to do with the practical question as to whether a given savage or anarchical enemy could be won over by reasoning. Of course he could not be won over unless he could reason. But we are considering only what reasons *ought* to interest him if he indeed is ready to consider true values. And the problem is whether by such questions as the foregoing we have in fact presented to our enemy considerations which involve bringing to his notice values which are true values whether he recognizes them or not.

In order to understand the sense in which such common-sense considerations do touch upon values that our opponent ought to recognize, it is necessary to reduce all such questions to their simplest possible formulation, and to put this formulation in the shape of propositions, and not in the form of mere questions. I am supposed to know that my enemy's principles and valuations are, at the outset, opposed to mine. My whole argument depends upon that admission. My argument, however, is so far simply that my will also is, just as a will, a real value in the world, and in my enemy's world. For, as I assert, it is a will which is of the same nature as his own will, and which therefore has the same kind of value that his own will has. I also have purposes just as truly as he has purposes.

The same considerations that suggest to him that his purposes are worthy to be carried out, suggest to him, if he is wise enough, that my purposes have precisely the worth of purposes, of intentions, of interests, and have this worth in exactly the same general sense in which his purposes have worth. You may well say that blinded passion indeed does not recognize the will of a person whom it desires to destroy as having any true value. I reply that of course blinded passion recognizes nothing of the sort. But that is just what makes passion blind, namely that it meets with the symptoms and expressions of opposing purposes in the world, and yet does not recognize them as having the same kind of life, and vigor, and meaning, that its own purposes possess. Part of civilized, and one may say the whole of rational consciousness of human values, depends upon recognizing *that any valuation which occurs in the world is just as much a fact as any other valuation, and is just as much to be taken into account by whoever wants to know the true value of things as is any other valuation.*

Herewith, however, I state a sort of first principle of ethics,—a crude principle I admit, but a principle. All sincere valuations of things, by whomsoever made, are themselves facts having value. Whoever wills anything,—that will has its own value. Whoever wants to know the values of things must take account of all values that any will sets upon things. Here is already a starting point for an objective doctrine of values.

You may be disposed to reply, at this point, that my account of the supposed argument with my enemy seems to presuppose that my enemy is a sympathetic man. You will say that sympathy and pity and the demands of humanity generally exist only in minds that already possess certain ideas of the value of human life, and of the desirableness of kindly action,—certain ideas which, if they exist in a mind, are indeed inconsistent with the simple desire to kill. But you will say that the success of my argument will depend in the supposed case solely upon the chance fact that my opponent may be a sympathetic person. But to this objection I retort by saying that I am not at all concerned with what psychological conditions will best serve to enable my enemy to take account of the fact that I have a will whose value is just as genuine as the value of his own will. Sympathy is indeed a very common condition prior to the attainment of insight into the values of life on the part of any of us. But the importance of sympathy in its contribution to a genuine insight into the value of human life, or into the meaning of human interests in general, does not depend upon the strength of sympathetic impulse, or upon the vigor of kindly feeling, which a given person may indeed possess or not, according to his nature and training. Sympathy is valuable in the present connection, solely in so far as it may help a man to see the truth. What I am trying to point out to my supposed opponent is the fact that I am just as much alive as he is, and that my purpose to live is therefore just as genuine, and in itself considered, just as significant a fact as is his interest in killing me. I am endeavoring not to teach my opponent to possess sympathetic feelings; I am trying to show him facts which are indeed not mere external things, but values. What I want him to see is that the value which I set upon my life is as genuine a fact in the world of values, as is the value that

he happens to set upon the taking of my life. If some sympathetic feelings of his help him to see this, so much the better for my success in my little beginning at ethical pedagogy. If he has no sympathetic feeling, perhaps my argument may indeed fail to bring home to him the existence of my valuation of my life. But this valuation which I set upon my life is a real fact and a real valuation, whether he is able to see it or not. And all that I am now maintaining is that so far as I have yet brought the matter to his attention, his will and my will, his valuation and my valuation, are facts of essentially the same kind. They are indeed not physical facts. They are values that somebody sets upon something. If his valuation can furnish a reason why something is worth doing, my valuation furnishes just as genuine a reason why something else may be worth doing. The question is so far indeed a somewhat impersonal one, at least so far as I am just now trying to state the case. I am not retorting to my opponent in the language of passion, that if he wants to kill me, I mean to kill him first. I am simply pointing out to him the truth, that his values and my values stand in the first place on an equal level. In principle, I am simply insisting on the truth that whoever wills anything in this world defines thereby a value, a something that is declared to be worth doing. I am drawing a conclusion, so far that what, in an impersonal sense, is objectively worth doing, depends as much and of course as little upon his private valuation as upon mine. Now just this sort of truth is the sort of truth that we recognize whenever we deal with men dispassionately, justly, fairly. When we try to deal thus sympathy may help us to see the truth. But sometimes sympathy as a mere feeling may even hinder us in the attempt to see such truth. Yet the truth when seen and however seen is of this sort: There are two men, A and B. A wants something, it may be an apple or a life, a piece of property or a revolution, success, or the expression of a private hatred. B wants something which cannot be obtained unless A's purpose is defeated. Both A and B thus set different values upon the same acts and things. Now the truth is that these values equally belong to the world of values. If we want to find out what the true value of the thing or of the act is, we must take account of both these valuations. So far as they merely exist, they furnish precisely equal reasons for viewing the act or the thing in a given way as possessed of value, it being presupposed of course that the opposing interests of A and B do not notably differ in intensity or in vigor.

The beginning of an insight into the truth of the world of values we get when we see *that it primarily makes no difference whereabouts in the world a valuation is situated*, namely, whether it is a valuation made by A, or a valuation made by B. It is this perfectly elementary consideration which I am so far trying to bring home to my opponent in the supposed argument during our truce. But it is precisely this elementary consideration upon which the whole organization of civilized life depends, so far as the organization has anything rational about it. For all that we call abstract justice, depends upon first viewing persons impersonally, and treating their private interests as the source of different, out equally true values.

I said a moment ago that things get value from the point of view of persons.

I now say that all personal estimates, if made with equal vigor, and if insisted upon with equal earnestness, stand upon precisely an equal rational footing. And to say this is to report a truth about the world of values,—an objective truth. This truth is there whether anyone recognizes it or not. My valuation is subjective; it depends upon my personal point of view. My opponent's valuation is subjective; it depends upon his personality and his plans. But the fact that both are valuations determines values which, whether we personally recognize them or not, are as real in the world of one of us, as they are in the world of the other; and the truth that these valuations of ours are facts in the same world of values:—this truth, I say, is objective, it exists apart from either of us, apart from both of us. A fair judge, if we could find one to whom to appeal our case, would recognize this truth, and would recognize it disinterestedly, that is, not because of his private interests, not necessarily because he was a sympathetic person, but simply because he is recognizing the truth as it is. We have then actually made a step forward in our effort to discover the values of things.

But you will indeed say that admitting all this to be a fair account of the situation would carry my opponent and myself only a very little way towards an agreement. Our ideals are, by hypothesis, unalterably opposed. They may both establish real values; but in this way it is impossible to determine what it is actually valuable in the supposed case to do. My enemy, if he is the head-hunter, wants my head; I want my life; one of us must fail to be satisfied. I admit that as the matter stands during our supposed truce, this deadlock appears to be the most probable situation. But suppose that, instead of a few moments' truce, we had time and power to make a considerable rearrangement of the life of both of us. His interest in getting my head is by hypothesis supposed to be determined by the social customs of his tribe. Suppose a device were suggested for altering the customs of his tribe, in the direction of the customs prevalent in a well-regulated company of civilized gentlemen. Then very possibly he might still remain my opponent, but he might then obtain the social prestige in his tribe which he now seeks through head-hunting,—he might obtain this prestige, I say, by overcoming me in a philosophical dispute, or by defeating me in a contest at the polls for a public office. In that case, he would on the whole live a life of greater security and happiness,—that is, a life more to his own once civilized taste than is the precarious one that he leads now. Some of my wishes might, under the circumstances, have indeed to be thwarted by his superiority in debate, or in politics. But, after all, my main point would be gained. I should have served him and his purpose with my head still on my shoulders. And he would have gained his desired prestige.

The proposal of such a plan to my head-hunting enemy would seem absurd enough if it were indeed offered in the supposed colloquy. But exactly such a plan has been proposed by the course of history to those individuals and peoples who have passed from savagery to civilization. We nowadays serve many of the purposes in the way of winning prestige, and of accomplishing social success,—many of the purposes, I say, that the head-hunter pursued; but we do so by devices which need kill nobody, and which go very far to harmonize interests

that in a more savage condition do seem indeed to be unalterably opposed. That it would be indeed absurd to propose such a plan to my supposed enemy during the truce, is due merely to the fact that we, as individual men, cannot live long enough, and cannot accomplish enough, to transform the civilization, or the stages of barbarism, in which we happen just now to live. But the process of social evolution, to which a thousand years are as a day, has actually accomplished many such results. Men have learned not necessarily to give up what was essential about their original valuations, but to harmonize their valuations, through a transformation, not so much of their own will, as of their social institutions. Or to generalize the case: If A's will and B's will give opposed valuations to a certain thing or act, it is frequently conceivable that some plan could be found whereby, through an introduction of new things, or of new acts, or of supplementary acts, into the situation, *the essential will of both A and B can be carried out*, in such wise that they now give valuations to the new situation which are no longer essentially opposed. That this is possible the evolution of civilized life shows. Most of the elemental passions of the civilized man are substantially identical with those of the savage. But the civilized man has learned ways of so adjusting his elemental nature to the facts of the social world, that everybody's purposes are carried out with less conflict than appeared necessary so long as men remained upon the savage level. This is what happens when war gradually gives place to commerce, when social prestige comes to be gained rather through peace than through killing, and when the countless more or less civilized devices for making one man's valuation of things successfully determine acts without defeating the other man's valuation, are carried into effect.

But now for one further notable consideration in this connection. If a situation exists in which A's valuation of things and B's valuation of things conflict, and if another situation can be suggested and attained, in which A's valuation and B's valuation, without being essentially altered as to their subjective character and intensity, are now no longer in conflict; in other words, if matters can be so arranged that A's will and B's will can cooperate with each other and help each other, instead of hindering each other, then the new and transformed situation *possesses more objective value than the old situation*. That is, a state of things in which A's will cooperates with B's will is better, other things being equal, than the situation in which A's will conflicts with B's will, and this again is an objective truth about the world of values. For in the one case whatever value A sets upon carrying out his own will is opposed to whatever value B sets upon carrying out his will. In the other case, where the wills cooperate, the same situation is valued alike by both the persons concerned. Hence there is truly more value in this case than in the former. Herewith we have won for our use a second general ethical principle.

As you will now see, we are not confined in studying the world of values to merely reporting the fact that one person values things in one way and another in another. For first we have the truth that personal valuations, if viewed as facts possessing equal vigor and intensity, are equally valid as establishing

values. In other words, the fact that two persons, A and B, equally emphasize different values, determines the truth that these two values have an equal place in the real world of values, and that so far neither of them is to be preferred. And secondly, if, as occurs throughout the history of civilization, we can discover devices for harmonizing the purposes of various people, the value that is thus obtained actually exceeds the value of the state of things in which these purposes are not harmonized. So far, then, we are dealing in the world of values with perfectly genuine truths. That A values something as much as B values something else, these are equally valuable facts. That the cooperation of two wills, the furthering of two purposes that might otherwise conflict is possible, enables us to say that a state of things in which given wills are harmonized is ethically more valuable than a state of things in which these same wills are not harmonized.

To return for the last time to my mythical colloquy with my enemy, what has just been said applies to that case simply in this sense. If we could agree upon a way of keeping the peace which would carry out the essential purposes of both of us, the carrying out of this agreement would have more value than the conflict itself possesses. For the conflict, if it occurs, can end at best in the success of only one of us. The peace, and the consequent cooperation of both of us, would by hypothesis accomplish what we are both seeking. And this would be an objectively valuable result, and would possess at least the value which both of us give to our own distinct purposes. I have no idea that such a consideration would carry me far with the head-hunter, but that is simply because the terms of peace would in such a case hardly yet be in sight. But such considerations have as a fact determined the progress of civilized mankind. The truce between the head-hunter and myself could not be prolonged. We should have to leave it to fortune what should result. But that rational truce, which wise men agree upon when they undertake to find out in a dispassionate way what is truly valuable in our human world, need not soon come to an end. Whoever has once conceived of the civilized art of harmonizing the wills of mankind, has discovered what it is to consider objective values. The union of many wills is superior to the conflict of wills. What is attained by cooperation has all the values that conflict keeps mutually opposed, and tends to unite them in one value. And this is a truth quite independent of the customs of any people, or of the conventional opinions of any man regarding what he privately thinks to be valuable.

### III

I have thus made a very imperfect beginning in suggesting the answer to the question, How we can reach objectively valid results regarding the values of conduct. I admit from every point of view the unsatisfactory character of those ethical principles which can be stated merely in these terms. But I point out that we have indeed already gone far enough, even in this elementary stage of our inquiry about the values of conduct, to suggest to us a sort of very brief and abstract moral code. This code will be a kind of formulation of the most

general values that conduct possesses. It would first emphasize the fact that anybody who values anything, in such wise that he wills something in order to realize that value, thereby determines an objective truth regarding the actual values that there are in the world. Whoever is to recognize values for their own sake, whoever wants to know the whole value of things, ought, ideally speaking, to take account of whatever valuation is made by any being that has a will of his own. Whatever valuation anybody sets upon anything thus constitutes in itself an elementary but indubitable moral fact. And a value is a value whoever it may be that defines it or that tries to bring it into existence. Since, however, the elementary valuations of men endlessly conflict, this first principle gives us merely a world in which no one determinate value appears as yet to be established. But our second consideration has brought this to our notice, namely, that it is possible by the devices of civilization, to harmonize the effective wills of people in such wise that many of their valuations, without ceasing to be essentially what they were, become so related, under civilized conditions, that these valuations no longer conflict, or that they no longer conflict as much as they originally did. What we notice from this point of view is that such harmony, in so far as it can be attained, has itself a value which is superior to the value that the various conflicting wills possess before the principle of harmony has been discovered. Our moral code expressing the two foregoing considerations in the form of commands, would simply formulate what a rational being sees to be the objectively valuable way of behavior.

Our little code would so far consist of two very abstract, and in their abstractness unpractical principles. The first principle would be: regard every man's will, whatever it be, as something that in itself is worth carrying out, if only that can be done without conflicting with the interests of any other man. This extremely unpractical general formula simply applies, as you see, to all mankind, the principle that every one of us applies to himself. Just as much as my will seems to me something elementally and obviously worth carrying out; so this precept bids me regard every man's will, as equally and elementally worth carrying out so long as that will alone is in question. The second principle runs thus: if there be any course of conduct by which the wills of many may be made to cooperate instead of to conflict, prefer that course of conduct to whatever course of conduct tends to keep up the conflict. This last maxim is also still unpractical, not because it is at all false in principle, but because in itself it tells us so little *about* the means whereby harmony can be secured, and even the criteria whereby we are to distinguish a course of conduct which tends towards harmony from a course of conduct which still tolerates conflict.

Had I no other considerations to suggest, regarding ethics, than these elementary and by themselves perfectly commonplace considerations, I should indeed not have ventured upon the present series of discussions. But in such matters it is well to begin with the simple and the commonplace. You see already, I hope, from these examples, one great difference between the study of external things and the study of values. When you study things, you describe them, and thus look for the laws of their behavior. When you study values, you

yourself value them; and thereupon you are led to conceive of a possible harmony of valuations. But beneath this contrast between the methods of the descriptive sciences and the methods of the doctrine of values lies, after all, a certain deep analogy between these methods. For the first rule in the scientific study of external things is: "Be objective; consider the facts as they are." And the first rule of the doctrine of values is: "View every valuation from the point of view of the one who makes that valuation. Put yourself in his place." And again the second rule of descriptive science is: "Look for the laws that bind the facts together." But the second rule of the doctrine of values is: "See whether some lawful sort of plan of action can be discovered whereby the conflicting valuation with which men begin can be harmonized." Descriptive science is thus inspired by the hope that there is law to be found in and beneath things. Ethical doctrine, on the other hand, expresses the resolution that there shall be a law whereby our chaotic elementary valuations may be harmonized. The two ways of procedure are thus contrasted; but they are equally expressions of our interest in the reasonableness of the world and of life.

But with this mere beginning of our ethical doctrine we cannot remain content. The next question is: How can men so proceed as to tend towards a harmonizing of their valuations, and towards a discovery of those modes of cooperation which have a higher value than the elementary impulsive valuations of individual men possess?

Here, as I have said, one answer is indeed to be found in that whole process of evolution by which men have passed from savagery to civilization. But so complicated an answer as this is indeed not very enlightening. I must simplify the matter by calling your attention to that characteristic of human nature upon which the power to harmonize depends. This characteristic we call, in Kant's phrase, man's Practical Reason, that is, his reason in its application to his own conduct.

Harmony, like charity, begins at home. Were man not individually disposed to be reasonable in forming his plans of conduct, he could never have discovered how to harmonize his plans with those of his neighbor. But as a fact, man is reasonable. He values even his own present impulses because they have some relation to his former purposes, to his future goals, to his ideals about himself, to his plans in life, to the sort of personality that he prefers to be. And the fundamental facts about the way in which every man comes to set a value upon himself, upon his own impulses, and upon his life as a whole are substantially as follows:—

Man lives in time. In my closing lecture, after our sketch of ethical doctrine is done, I shall have occasion to show you at greater length what a curious and wonderful conception this our idea of time is, and how far that idea goes to determine our whole view of ourselves, and of our whole world of values. Man lives, I say, in time. That means, first, that man is always looking into the future for values that he has not yet attained. "Man never is, but always to be blessed." It is the changing, the oncoming, the expected, of which he is in pursuit. Therefore it is that he does not merely wait for valuable experiences to come

to him. Man is restless. He acts. He creates values. And acting he strains onwards into the future.

And even as he does this, man also looks backwards, to his past, to what has been. In the past he finds, not only what he has experienced, but what he has already decided upon, as the thing to be done. In the past lie my plans, purposes, leading motives, guiding principles. In the future lie my coming fortunes,—my winning or losing of values. In the present lies my chance to do something to carry out my will. And now, whenever I use my reason to guide my action, I do three things. First I look backwards, to my memory of my past decisions and of my former purposes, to learn why it is that I am here, and what I am now to undertake to do. I came to this point of my life with this or this intention. This it was that I was to carry out. This or this was my business. So far my present use of my practical reason gets its basis. Without a memory of a past, I might indeed have this or this present impulse, and so might find this or this present value in things. But the values thus to be found are of little moment in comparison with the values that my present life gets by virtue of my memory of past intents, of former plans, agreements, resolutions, undertakings. I actually value as I do my present act, because I remember my past. Were I to forget who I have so far been, and what I have been meaning to do, my present impulses would lose nearly all their more rational value. So much, then, for the first of my three rational deeds when I use my reason to guide my action.

But secondly, I look forward,—forward to my future, to my goal, to what I hope to get by my present deed. Yonder lies that of which I am in search. Yonder lies what I seek, what I pursue, and what I mean yet to create, what I mean to be. Had I no idea of a future, my present deed would lose most of its rational value. And thus to look to the future is to perform the second of my three acts of reason.

But thirdly, when I use my reason to guide my conduct, I look not only at the past, and at the future, but at the present. Just now I am to do something. What? Well something that is, so to speak, aligned between my past intention and my future goal,—just as one who sets stakes in a garden border aligns a middle stake between two stakes already set. From my own personal point of view, as a reasonable being, I value a present act as right or as wrong, for my own purposes, according as this act is or is not on the line, so to speak, which leads from my past intention towards my future goal. Or again, I value as right the act which, so far as I can see, harmonizes my present impulses with my remembered past and my intended future.

This perfectly characteristic feature of all our reasonable valuations furnishes a basis for giving the general notion of the harmony of many valuations in one common life a much more vital and concrete form than our first statement gave to that very general view. Man, in the long run, is adapted to harmonize his own plans with those of his fellows, because, as a reasonable being, he is constantly trying to harmonize his own present impulses with his past purposes and with his future goal. The task of attaining such harmony involves the whole

business of forming, finding, remembering, and anticipating what a man calls his own personal life,—his true Self.

By these considerations we add, to our first abstract statement of our moral code, this supplement:—All valuations, in a rational being, have reference to past purposes, to future goals, and to the alignment of present deeds with these past and future purposes and goals, as those are conceived by the Self that is in question. Thus what a man just now values depends, so far as he is reasonable, upon the sort of Self that he wants to be. For a person, a Self is just a conscious life lived according to plans,—it is a series of present deeds each determined in so far as it is truly the deed of this Self, by past intents of this Self, and by this Self's own anticipations of the future, and by the constant adjustment or harmonizing of present impulses to these intents and to these anticipations.

If you want then to understand valuations as they exist for reasonable beings, you must become acquainted with the types of personal ideals that are most important amongst men. And after viewing such personal ideals,—after finding what sorts of selfhood men most are disposed to prefer, then, if indeed you want to see the general way by which men have harmonized, and may yet further harmonize their varying valuations and their various lives, you must consider what ideal of personal life, what systems of remembered plans and of anticipated objects of desire, and what method of harmonizing present impulses with past and with future intents and goals, best serve also to help men to get into harmony with one another's plans. That is, you must see what sort of human Self is the best harmonizer, both of its own life, and of the social order in which it lives.

We have now taken our first look at the world of values. We are to study that world first by tolerantly viewing every valuation that anybody makes as, in itself considered, a fact that in its own time and place, and as an elementary fact of value, should be valued by all men; but secondly, by regarding as more valuable those valuations, and those resulting deeds of men, that tend to harmonize life, and as most valuable those valuations and deeds that most tend to harmonize life. Hereupon, coming closer to the facts, we have seen that every man values his own present impulses in the light of their relation to his own past and future purposes and goals; so that if you want to judge fairly the world of human valuations, you must study the ideals of selfhood, or of personality, that most rule amongst men. Finally we have set for ourselves the special task of trying to see what sort of personal ideal, what sort of Self, most tends to the inner harmony of its own ideals and deeds, and hence most tends to the harmonizing of the social life in which this sort of Self finds its place.

I shall devote my next lecture to a study of certain ideals of personality that have played a great part in the discovery of how to harmonize life.