
Review

Reviewed Work(s): Race Questions and Other American Problems by Josiah Royce

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public. Pellissier is too indulgent at times, whether he speaks (pp. 48-49, 94-99, 150, 257, 266-267) or whether he avoids to say anything.

Leaving aside the special purpose for which Pellissier drew his picture of Voltaire, let us ask a question: Does Voltaire, as a thinker, *Voltaire philosophe*, come out from Pellissier's book greater or smaller than we had him in mind? That he appears rather smaller is, of course, a merely personal opinion. When the writer first started reading the book, he said to himself: How is it possible to summarize Voltaire's philosophy within three hundred pages? And when he closed the book his idea was rather the reverse; namely, if one was to drop the detailed explanations, the minor points accidentally important because they may be made to apply to special circumstances of the present day, and the refutations of modern scholars discussing Voltaire, the book would be shorter, and still be perfectly fair to the whole *bagage philosophique* of Voltaire. As a matter of fact, Voltaire has the ideas of a man of good sense to-day; good, common-sense ideas, but ideas which are not sufficient to solve any difficult problem of life. It would hardly be too much to say that if, by imagination, one were to remove Voltaire from the history of philosophy, not one original thought would be lost to humanity; he prepared the way for thinkers in popularizing useful, common-sense truths, but he has contributed none himself. What remains inimitable in Voltaire is the way he puts things, so clearly, so cleverly, so wittily: he is far greater by his art than by his ideas.

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Race Questions and other American Problems. JOSIAH ROYCE. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1908. Pp. 287.

The five essays in this volume were delivered as popular addresses before various audiences. As the author states in the preface, this volume is part of an effort to apply, to some of our American problems, that general doctrine about life which he has expounded at length in his book entitled "The Philosophy of Loyalty." He hopes that the various special opinions here expressed may be judged in the light of that philosophy. The present volume he regards as an auxiliary to its more systematic predecessor. This philosophy of loyalty is the practical aspect and expression of the author's idealistic philosophy. It is his answer to the pragmatist's protest that idealism is not a practical philosophy.

The closing essay of the present volume contains a summary of the theses upon which the philosophy of loyalty is based. The principle is stated thus: "*Be loyal, and be in such wise loyal that, whatever your own cause, you remain loyal to loyalty.*" That is, so choose your cause, and so serve it, that, as a result of your activity, there shall be more of this common good of loyalty in the world than there would have been had you not lived and acted. Let your loyalty be such loyalty as helps your neighbor to be loyal. Despite the diversity of the individual causes—the families, countries, professions, friendships—to which you and your neighbor are loyal, so act that the devotion of each shall respect and aid the other's loyalty" (p. 248).

Everywhere that he has given an exposition of the new philosophy, both in this book and in his "Philosophy of Loyalty," Professor Royce is keenly aware of the fundamental criticism that will be offered to the doctrine of loyalty to loyalty. How is the first loyalty to which we are asked to be loyal determined? The author says: "But I freely admit that many men who have been enthusiastically and effectually loyal to various causes, and who in their personal lives have won as mature a notion of loyalty as they were capable of getting, have nevertheless often committed, in the name of loyalty, great crimes. And you may well ask how I explain this fact. You may well wonder how loyalty can be a central moral principle, when lives that were as loyal as the men in question knew how to make them have often been morally mischievous lives. My answer is that our loyalty leads us into moral error only in so far as we are indeed often blind to what the principle of loyalty actually means and requires. And such blindness is, as men go, human enough and common enough. The corrective to such errors, however, is not the introduction of some other moral principle than that of loyalty, but is just the discovery of the internal meaning, the true sense of the loyal principle itself. Whoever is loyal loves loyalty for its own sake" (p. 245).

The author makes the saving distinction for his doctrine between mere blind loyalty and enlightened loyalty. The former has done mischief in the past because it is pseudo-loyalty. It is turned into enlightened loyalty when it reaches the second dimension of loyalty, so to speak—the stage of loyalty to loyalty. The first commandment is: Be loyal. The second: Be loyal to loyalty. "That is, regard your neighbor's loyalty as something sacred. Do nothing to make him less loyal. Never despise him for his loyalty, however little you care for the cause he chooses. If your cause and his cause come into some inevitable conflict, so that you indeed have to contend with him, fight, if your loyalty requires you to do so; but in your bitterest warfare fight only against what the opponent does. Thwart his acts where he justly should be thwarted; but do all this in the very cause of loyalty itself, and never do anything to make your neighbor disloyal" (p. 253). From these consequences of his central principle follow all those propositions about the special duties of life which can be reasonably defined and defended. Justice, kindness, chivalry, charity—these are all of them forms of loyalty to loyalty.

In the first essay, on "Race Questions and Prejudices," Professor Royce finds the solution for our southern race problem by a study of the English solution of the once serious race question in Jamaica. The English have solved their problem by the simplest means in the world—by administration and reticence. "When once the sad period of emancipation and of subsequent occasional disorder was passed, the Englishman did in Jamaica what he has so often and so well done elsewhere. He organized his colony; he established good local courts, which gained by square treatment the confidence of the blacks. The judges of such courts were Englishmen. The English ruler also provided a good country constabulary, in which native blacks also found service, and in which they could exercise authority over other blacks. Black men, in other words,

were trained, under English management, of course, to police black men" (p. 22). Therefore Professor Royce concludes that "The southern race problem will never be relieved by speech or by practises such as increase irritation. It will be relieved when administration grows sufficiently effective, and when the negroes themselves get an increasingly responsible part in this administration in so far as it relates to their own race" (p. 29).

In the second essay, on "Provincialism," the author maintains that "in the present state of the world's civilization, and of the life of our own country, the time has come to emphasize, with new meaning and intensity, the positive value, the absolute necessity for our welfare, of a wholesome provincialism, the saving power to which the world in the near future will need more and more to appeal." The present state of civilization the world over is such as defines a new social mission which the province and not the nation as a whole can fulfill. "False sectionalism, which disunites, will indeed always remain as great an evil as ever it was. But the modern world has reached a point where it needs, more than ever before, the vigorous development of a highly organized provincial life. Such a life, if wisely guided, will not mean disloyalty to the nation; and it need not mean narrowness of spirit, nor yet the further development of jealousies between various communities. . . . But the two tendencies, the tendency toward national unity and that toward local independence of spirit, must henceforth grow together. They can not prosper apart. The national unity must not kill out, nor yet hinder, the provincial self-consciousness. The loyalty to the republic must not lessen the love and the local pride of the individual community. The man of the future must love his province more than he does to-day. His provincial customs and ideals must be more and not less highly developed, more and not less self-conscious, well established, and earnest" (pp. 64-66).

In the third essay, "On Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America," Professor Royce sees "mischief done by an unwise exaggeration of the tendency among Americans to reason, to argue, to trust to mere formulas, to seek for the all-solving word; in brief, to bring to consciousness what for a given individual ought to remain unconscious. . . . Thought, in any individual, must freely set limits to its own finite task. And when the thoughtful lovers of ideals forget this fact, they become mere wranglers, or doctrinaires, or pedants, or, on the other hand, in the end, through failure in thinking, they become cynics. . . . Now the human mind, in its present form of consciousness, is simply incapable of formulating all its practical devices under any one simple rule. . . . Restless search for the immediate presence of the ideal is often vain, like the pioneer idealism that burns the forests merely to see what they hide. Much of the best in human nature simply escapes our present definitions, is known only by its fruits, and prospers best in the forest shade of unconsciousness. . . . We are primarily creatures of instinct; and instinct is not merely the part of us that allies us with the lower animals. The highest in us is also based upon instinct, and only a portion of your instincts can ever be formulated. You will be able in this life to tell what they mean in only a few instances. But your life's best work will

depend upon all of your good instincts together. Hence a great part of your life's work will never become a matter of your own personal and private consciousness at all. It is one of the duties of the thoughtful lover of ideals, then, to know that he can not turn into conscious thinking all of his ideal activities" (pp. 152-153).

The fourth essay, "The Pacific Coast," will hardly interest students of philosophy as much as the others, although it contains a very suggestive psychological study of the relations of climate and civilization. Professor Royce's estimate of the civilization of the Pacific Coast is, in the opinion of the reviewer, himself a native and a long-time resident of the state, an entirely just one. Californians are noted for their "independence of judgment," "their carelessness about what the outside world may think of them," "their apparent freedom in choosing what manner of men they should be," their "confident and somewhat abrupt speech, particularly in speaking of the boundless future prosperity of their state." All these characteristics the author believes rest back, in large measure, on the peculiar climate and geographical isolation of the state.

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REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. January, 1909. *Examen critique des systèmes classiques sur l'origine de la pensée religieuse* (1^{er} article) (pp. 1-28): E. DURKHEIM. - A critical demonstration of the insufficiency of current naturism and animism as explanations of the origin of religious thought. *Comment fonctionne mon cerveau: essai de psychologie introspective* (pp. 29-40): H. BEAUNIS. - The most fruitful ideas come unsought and often develop themselves subconsciously. This subconscious work is done without fatigue. *L'analogie scientifique* (pp. 41-54): J. SAGERET. - Scientific analogy gets its value from coexistent and related analogies, and scientific certainty surpasses analogy only in the weight of its associated analogies. *Observations et documents*. E. GOBLOT: *Un cas d'association latente*. *Revue générale*. F. PICAVET: *Thomisme et philosophie médiévale (fin)*. *Analyses et comptes rendus*: Le Dantec, *Science et conscience*: H. DAUDIN. Vialleton, *Un problème de l'évolution*: F. LE DANTEC. Petrucci, *Essai sur une théorie de la vie*: H. DAUDIN. Manville, *Les découvertes modernes en physique*: ABEL REY. Bouty, *La vérité scientifiques: sa poursuite*: J. SAGERET. P. Souriau, *Les conditions du bonheur*: OSSIP LOURIÉ. Bayet, *Les idées mortes*: FR. PAULHAN. Ch. Lalo, *L'esthétique expérimentale contemporaine*: L. ARRÉAT. *Annales de l'institut international de sociologie*: J. DELVILLE. Berthelot, *Évolutionisme et Platonisme*: G. H. LUQUET. A. Riehl, *Der philosophische Kritizismus*: G. H. LUQUET. *Revue des périodiques étrangers*.

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